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 ABSTRACT 
The main aim of the research was to critically analyse the potential impact of targeted 
sanctions in promoting or impeding democracy in Zimbabwe. The research was centred 
around the conflicting views on the use of targeted sanctions as a tool in coercing and 
dissuading the target governments pursuing retrogressive policies deemed undemocratic. 
The use of targeted sanctions is a fairly new discourse in international relations and the 
efficacy of which is highly debatable. Due to the failure to recognise and promote human 
rights and its covenants on economic, social and cultural rights, Zimbabwe has been under 
targeted sanctions for over a decade. Disputed elections, the chaotic land reform program, 
and poor monetary policies compounded the problem.  
 
To understand democracy and sanctions, two theories were used, namely; the substantive 
approach to the theory of democracy and the institutional theory of sanctions. In order to 
achieve the objectives of the study, a triangulation was used where both qualitative and 
quantitative research designs were used. In depth interviews were conducted with key 
informants who were conveniently selected.  Questionnaires were self-administered in 
order to achieve a high return rate. The researcher made use of thematic data analysis by 
examining themes and patterns emerging from the data.  Furthermore, secondary data in 
the form of historical statistical data, journals, newspaper articles and government reports 
were used to complement the study.  In total 85 usable questionnaires were returned, and 
eight interviews were successfully conducted.  
 
The empirical evidence shows that generally, there is a negative perception with regards to 
controversial laws passed by the government in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Interviewees 
differed in their perceptions with regards to ZANU PF’s repressive laws. However, there was 
consensus on the partial success of sanctions in aiding democracy in Zimbabwe. Suggestions 
are that, sanctions fuelled the party’s quest for power and domination which had a negative 
domino effect on the economy and ultimately on the ordinary people. Ironically, the 
Government of National Unity formed in 2009 assisted in reversing some of the stringent 
policies, measures and laws passed by the Government in response to the sanctions. The 
study concludes that the use of sanctions as a protest action on undemocratic regimes 
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should consider the country’s socio-political factors. Considering the above issues, for the 
country to be re-integrated into the international community, there is need to mend its 
diplomatic course for the sake of its citizens and transition to a more viable democratic 
system. This would aid in forging an appropriate sanction package without harming ordinary 
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PREFACE 
In the 21st century, the promotion of democracy has characterised American hegemony and 
sanctions continue to be used to promote democracy. International standards and 
international law are promulgated in adherence to democratic principles and values. These 
international standards entail the recognition and promotion of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and covenants on economic, social and cultural rights. When a government in 
power contravenes extensively with these international standards, it deviates from the 
agreed norms and values of governing people. This usually results in intervention by the 
international community through sanctions or military intervention. 
ZANU PF has been under sanctions for the past decade for supposedly contravening the 
above agreed norms and values of governing Zimbabweans.  Currently, a series of the 
targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe are being removed as incentives for improvements 
towards ruling democratically with further supports   from the MDC.  The study therefore 
seeks to explore the links identified above in order to ascertain the effects sanctions have 
had on democracy in Zimbabwe.  
The study is therefore important as it looks at how best democracy can be promoted in 
countries like Zimbabwe where individual rights and freedoms are violated. The study 
couples democracy and sanctions because the latter has become the most popular method 
for Western countries to promote democracy, therefore the study is relevant in 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Sanctions have, for a long time, been used as a form of diplomacy to deter and dissuade against 
certain actions in the international arena. However sanctions have only recently been used in 
international relations by those pursuing to enforce democracy.  
In its bid to police the world, the West has exploited the international political economy to 
impose economically crippling sanctions against statesmen or countries who have infringed on 
human rights and freedoms. However, it has refrained from incurring the costs and burden of 
active intervention in countries where human rights and freedoms are infringed upon. In 
addition, the West has capitalised on their position at the apex of that globalization pyramid. 
Globalization has facilitated international trade and financial interdependence and due to the 
West’s influence on Globalisation, it has given the West the political and economic power to 
impose sanctions on other states. However, as highlighted, sanctions are fairly new in the 
international arena particularly as a tool for promoting democracy, and their effectiveness is 
still to be determined.   
A case that may assist in determining the effectiveness of sanction in efforts of encouraging 
democracy is Zimbabwean. Zimbabwe has been under sanctions for more than a decade and it 
is therefore the aim of the study to investigate whether sanctions have been an aid or 







2 | P a g e  
 
1.1. SANCTIONS 
According to Baldwin (1985), sanctions are a coercive policy instrument used to influence the 
target state’s behaviour. Sanctions have been identified as an alternative to military force used 
when the country imposing sanctions is unwilling to incur the cost of a military expedition to 
express their displeasure in the opposing state (Baldwin, 1985). Sanctions have been a tool of 
state craft for centuries, dating back to the Athenians when they used economic trade 
sanctions to dissuade other countries from trading with their closest rivals, Sparta (Crawford, 
1999). However, according to Crawford (1999), there have been more cases of sanctions being 
passed than there has been of sanctions being successful. In the 20th century, during the Cold 
War, only two United Nations mandated sanctions were passed against Rhodesia(now 
Zimbabwe) and South Africa, the latter being the only case were they were considered to show 
some results of success (Crawford, 1999) . According to Crawford (1999), other successful 
sanctions include those posed against Gaddafi and Libya in 1999 and against former Serbian 
leader Slobodan Milosevic for his aggressive policies in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
Johnson (1998) postulates that there are a variety of forms of sanctions which can be imposed 
against a country or statesmen and the most popular sanctions include economic and financial 
sanctions. Other forms of sanctions may be in the form of arms embargoes which block arms 
trade between official dealers and the sanctioned government and diplomatic sanctions which 
result in isolation from the international community.  The use of the measure of sanctions has 
broadened under United Nations articles since 1990. However, Drezner (1999) is of the opinion 
that all the types of sanctions mentioned above are all-encompassing sanctions which tend to 
hurt the entire population.  Drezner (1999) further comments that to mitigate the damage 
made by sanctions on the population, sanctions have taken the form of smart or targeted 
sanctions. 
 1.1.2. SMART / TARGETED SANCTIONS 
 Smart sanctions are used to coerce particular individuals, political parties and companies which 
are part of lobbying for policies deemed undemocratic. Targeted sanctions are comprised of 
arms embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans and visa restrictions (Drezner, 1999). Another form 
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of sanctions which may be imposed is called selective sanctions and comprises of aid cuts and 
financial restrictions.  These are more comprehensive than targeted sanctions, however 
selective sanctions and targeted sanctions are often used together under the appearance of 
smart sanctions as they are said to complement each other. According to Taylor (2010), arms 
embargoes are imposed to control military powers, particularly in cases where the sanctioned 
individuals and groups utilise state apparatus to undermine democracy and perpetuate conflict. 
The purpose of the arms embargo is to deprive military agents of weapons and equipment, 
however, Taylor (2010) notes that the result of the shortage in weapons often creates  a 
financial interest where the gap in supply and demand causes price to increase and encourages 
weapons smuggling for profits. Furthermore it is suggested by Taylor (2010) that those who 
impose the arms embargo have the resources required to facilitate the smuggling of weapons. 
These individuals or countries therefore benefit from the sanctions motivating for the 
continuation of the embargo and sustaining the conflict; it is in such cases that the entire 
population is affected.   
On the other hand, targeted travel bans and visa restrictions have minimal or no effect on the 
population of countries with sanctioned individuals.  In the opinion of Taylor (2010) travel bans 
isolate the targeted individual from the rest of the world particularly to continents with 
important business interests. This proved to be a success when Milosevic and about six 
hundred other individuals were banned from travelling in Europe.  However, Taylor (2010) 
further notes that travel bans and visa restrictions are not as effective as they represent a mere 
loss of privilege. It is noted by Taylor (2010) that the imposition of visa restrictions on the 
Zimbabwean Africa National Union Patriot Front (ZANU PF) has somehow affected the rest of 
population as it became difficult for Zimbabwean citizens to acquire visas to European countries 
despite not being banned. Taylor (2010) proposes that the seizure of foreign assets is another 
effective tool in coercing countries to abide by democratic principles.  Taylor (2010) notes that 
although seizure of assets is still an effective way of forcing individuals and entities to comply,  
most undemocratic regimes hide their assets and money to secure a source of income  to fund 
and sustain them or to flee the country and  diversify investments. Identifying these assets has 
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proven to be a challenge to  the sanctioning country, as ways of tracking and revealing these 
assets improves, so do the methods of concealing them.  
As noted previously by Drezner (1999), targeted sanctions are only aimed at particular 
individuals and not the entire population. Portela (2013) reveals that, targeted sanctions are 
meant to indicate to the population that the sanctioning country is displeased with the targeted 
regime’s behaviour and more importantly, that the sender wishes no harm to the rest of 
population of the receiving state. Portela (2013) further states that, unlike all-encompassing 
sanctions, targeted sanctions do not aim to have a significant impact on the economy or to 
cause a humanitarian crisis Targeted sanctions are only meant to cut loyalty ties and support 
for the targeted regime isolating them domestically and internationally.   
As highlighted before, sanctions may be in the form of diplomatic measures and targeted 
sanctions are an advantage to the sender as they are a refined form of diplomacy which can be 
regulated.  According to Portela (2013), the regulations of targeted sanctions are accompanied 
by varying measures of imposition from stern measures to eased measures. This may be used 
to indicate the recognition of change in behaviour. This however requires extensive monitoring 
and deduction in a hostile environment where data collection may be difficult for foreigners 
and restricted to natives which may at times be unreliable. 
However, Drezner (1999) notes that smart sanctions have proved not as effective and reliable 
as studies have shown.  Despite being targeted at particular individuals , they result in the 
detriment of the population at large. As an example, Drezner (1999) comments that in Iraq, 
after the United States of America (USA) had passed smart sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s 
repressive government in 2002, the sanctions had a resultant effect on the Iraq people as the 
government became more repressive. 
According to Muller (1999), Western countries fail to take into consideration the internal 
political economy of a targeted state hence the citizens of the targeted country who are not 
able to shield themselves for economically damaging sanctions suffer from the targeted 
sanctions.  Targeted sanctions are only a facet of the concept of sanctions which is still being 
developed, and therefore, the success or failure of sanctions still operated under trial and error. 
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However Galtung (1976) contends that if the elite are pressured by political disintegration the 
whole system will eventually collapse:  
Galtung, (1976, 388) further notes that, “The idea is that there is a limit to how much value 
deprivation to the system can stand, and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in 
leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed rapidly 
and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate”. 
However, taking into consideration the many factors that affect the imposition of sanctions , the 
above assertion seems naïve. According to Portela (2013), in the event that sanctions 
destabilize the economy and political base of the targeted state, the targeted elite can sustain 
themselves if there are alternatives. Despite sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), the USA and the European Union (EU), Iran has continued its nuclear 
enrichment programme. Through new alliances in Latin America and Africa, Tehran has 













6 | P a g e  
 
1.2. DEMOCRACY 
 In the opinion of Peksen and Drury (2010), in the 21st century, the promotion of democracy has 
characterised American hegemony and sanctions continue to be used to promote democracy. 
International standards and international law are promulgated in adherence to democratic 
principles and values. These international standards entail the recognition and promotion of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and covenants on economic, social and cultural 
rights (Doxey, 1987).  Pape (1997) postulates that when a government in power contravenes 
extensively with these international standards, it deviates from the agreed norms and values of 
governing people. This usually results in intervention by the international community through 
sanctions or military intervention. Peksen and Drury (2010) are of the opinion that sanctions 
may be viewed as “carrot and stick” diplomacy where a change in policy by the sanctioned 
government might result in rewards in the form of aid and loans, as a government pursues 
more democratic policies the international community offers more developmental aid, 
however deviating from the international standards may results in more punitive sanctions. 
Major Powers in the international arena are also increasingly using sanctions to achieve and 
advance their own international political agendas (Peksen and Drury, 2010). 
Taking into consideration how the transition to democracy in Africa has been a slow and at 
times a regressive process, it can be argued that following international standards and norms is 
a Western way of implementing democracy (Breytenbach, 1996).  Breytenbach (1996) further 
notes that Western countries constantly insist on elections and voting in Africa; however voting 
is merely a variable within the concept of democracy resulting in a situation where the 
population is involved only passively without proper participation in the democratic process. 
Breytenbach (1996) comments that without understanding the political economy of the  
targeted regime’s state, the advocating of Western countries  for democracy becomes 
regressive considering that a multitude of other  factors within the concept of democracy are  
undermined. A stable and viable economy for example is particularly important and to sustain a 
democracy.  Breytenbach (1996) further contends that variables that make up democracy 
should complement each other for there to be a feasible transition to democracy. Therefore, 
when Western countries impose sanctions insisting on elections and voting there is a possibility 
7 | P a g e  
 
that it might result in regressive patterns as democracy is much complex more than just voting. 
The pursuit of democracy therefore becomes a complex issue as the idealized form of 
democracy being advocated for by Western countries might not be suitable for Africa.  
1.3. ZIMBABWE’S TARGETED SANCTIONS 
 According to Masunungure and Badza (2010), Zimbabwe has been under the rule of President 
Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF since 1980. Ever since Zimbabwe’s independence until 1996, 
President Mugabe has competed in presidential elections largely unopposed until the 
emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. Zimbabwe had essentially 
become a one party state which gave ZANU PF the incentive to yield more power blurring the 
lines separating the power between    the government, the judiciary, military and police, as 
these were used to further ZANU PF’s political agenda (Maposa, Muguti and Tobias, 2013). 
According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), the warning signs of an emerging repressive government 
in Zimbabwe had always been there but had been ignored by the West. An example of this was 
when the persecution and massacre of up to twenty thousand Ndebele people in the 1980’s 
occurred and was ignored by the West and no sanctions were imposed against ZANU PF. It was 
only in 2000, after the controversial Fast Track Land Reform programme, with subsequent 
political instability and government repression, that the West imposed smart sanctions against 
Zimbabwe. 
According to the APPA Report (2009)1, land in Zimbabwe has been a central driving force for 
the volatile political dynamics.  In the Second Chimurenga (Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation) land 
was a prominent motivating factor and even at the signing of the ceasefire of the Chimurenga 
war, President Mugabe was reluctant to sign the Lancaster House Agreement due to 
disagreements pertaining to land1.  According to the HRW Report (2002)2,in the perspective of 
the ZANU PF, the Fast Track Land Reform programme was meant to correct the historical 
imbalances of land holding brought about by colonialism. However, the white Zimbabwean 
farmers saw this as a violation of their property rights  as a large number of them were 
                                                                 
1             All-Party Parliamentary Africa Group report. 2009. Land in Zimbabwe. (Ben Chigara, 2013) 
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Zimbabwean by birth. Moreover, ZANU PF implemented legislation which denied white farmers 
of the right to challenge the government in court over issues pertaining to land and this 
deviated from the agreed norms and standards under international law. The Fast Track Land 
Reform programme was one of the main issues which put Zimbabwe in the spotlight for human 
rights violations. 
Moyo and Yeros (2007) are of the opinion that amidst all that was unfolding in Zimbabwe the 
MDC seized the opportunity to be the main opposition party to ZANU PF as the only dominant 
party in the country. MDC seemingly sympathized with the white farmers and tried to 
champion the human rights cause for white farmers against the ZANU PF government. 
Furthermore the MDC presented itself to Britain as a suitable and competent candidate to form 
a government if Britain’s campaign of ‘regime change’ in Zimbabwe succeeded. MDC therefore 
filled the political vacuum of an opposition party to ZANU PF; however its emergence was 
unwelcome by ZANU PF considering the extensive impact the MDC had in the country. The 
MDC’s close affiliations to trade unions proved to provide a useful source of supporters 
furthermore the civil society who rallied behind MDC for the promotion and protection of 
human rights in Zimbabwe. 
Despite MDC contesting in both parliamentary and presidential elections, ZANU PF always 
maintained a majority in parliament and President Mugabe’s remained president through 
elections that were always deemed flawed (Ferguson, 2005). According to Eckstein (1975) 
ZANU PF responded to the rise of MDC ferociously and sought to mitigate any challenge to its 
power and reign. All who challenged the party’s power in Zimbabwe were labelled as dissidents 
and agents of the West. As a result ZANU PF developed the need to control the rise of rival (as 
indicated in the substantive theory of democracy which denotes that the central issue with 
dictatorships is control). This meant the control of ideas and the censorship of opposition which 
resulted in limitation of individual expression. (Eckstein, 1975) as indicated  
 
Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) are of the opinion that the labelling of MDC as dissidents 
and agents of the West was a way of controlling the manner in which the citizens thought and 
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acted. Once this was accomplished any actions against dissidents would seem justified. 
Therefore, in efforts to deal with the dissidents, a series of laws were passed in Zimbabwe to 
legalize law actions perpetrated by ZANU PF to maintain power in Zimbabwe.  Maposa, Muguti 
and Tobias (2013) are further of the opinion that laws such as the Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA) passed in 2002 and 
enforced subjectively, form part of the repressive laws inhibiting freedom of speech, rights of 
assembly and association in Zimbabwe.  
As a result of these laws, the ZANU PF faced pressure from the international community to 
answer to the several accusations of human rights and the civil society violations. Independent 
media were able to provide these answers, however, AIPA enabled ZANU PF to control and 
censor media information. In 2002 the Daily News, the then largest independent newspaper 
was shut down and journalists were arrested due to extensive criticism of the ZANU PF 
government. According to Magaisa (2009), the draconian legislation in Zimbabwe was passed 
under the guise of sovereignty and an anti-colonial rhetoric used as a disguise for all of 
Zimbabwe’s shortcomings.  
According to Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013), ZANU PF escalated their control and power 
and amended the Private Voluntary Organizations Act which governs Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in an attempt to control the organizations which dealt with human rights 
and governance. This was also a way to control organizations in the civil society that dealt with 
democracy. 
Actions by ZANU PF were a clear repression of the human rights and freedoms of the 
Zimbabwean people. Their actions aimed to consolidate power which effectively undermined 
democracy in the name of sovereignty. However according to Bush and Szeftel ( 2002) it seems 
perplexing how genuine sovereignty can truly exist without democracy, when a government 
turns on its own people it ultimately loses its legitimacy and sovereignty allowing for 
humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the quest for sovereignty, by ZANU PF, at the expense of 
democracy appears to be self-defeating since sovereignty and democracy complement one 
another.   
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According to Moyo and Yeros (2009), in response to political crisis and human rights violations 
in Zimbabwe, Britain passed travel bans and froze the assets of high ranking ZANU PF officials 
and imposed arms embargoes against Zimbabwe as well. Since Zimbabwe is a former British 
colony Britain expressed more interest in Zimbabwe’s affairs. Britain felt obliged to intervene so 
as to please a domestic audience who felt that had they had their kith and kin embroiled in 
battles with ZANU PF over properties and land.  
Sims, Masamvu and Mirell (2010) comment that sanctions imposed by the EU on Zimbabwe 
were not mandated by the UN hence the continuous criticism by ZANU PF. However the legal 
framework used for passing sanctions on Zimbabwe adhered to the Common Foreign Security 
Policy which represented the EU‘s position on the political situation in Zimbabwe. Furthermore 
Zimbabwe was a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement which is a partnership between the EU 
and certain African and Asian countries. The agreement was spearheaded by the European 
Development Fund which gave it the legal right enforce punitive measures for not observing 
human rights and the rule of law.  
In 2002 the EU then imposed sanctions against the ZANU PF regime which comprised of an 
arms embargo including non-lethal equipment as well as a ban on financial aid on any military 
related activity (Sims, Masamvu and Mirell, 2010). By 2011, travel bans were also imposed on 
up to one hundred and sixty three people and thirty one entities , all in connection to activities 
that undermined democracy and the rule of law (Sims, Masamvu and Mirell, 2010). The 
European Union also suspended aid for projects run by the government however; an exception 
was made for projects that directly supported the population (Sims, Masamvu and Mirell, 
2010). 
 In 2001 the USA had imposed targeted sanctions against ZANU PF officials as well.  Maposa, 
Muguti and Tobias (2013) note that besides the targeted sanctions, the United States Congress 
also passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery bill (ZDERA) which, not only 
harmed the ZANU PF, but the Zimbabwean population as a whole, since the funding of projects 
in Zimbabwe ceased and credit lines were cut which were significant in subsidizing key 
ministries such as health and education in Zimbabwe. The United States Congress passed 
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ZDERA under the claim that the people of Zimbabwe had been excluded from economic and 
political participation due to ZANU PF’s economic mismanagement, undemocratic practices and 
the involvement of Zimbabwean troops in the Second Congo civil war (ZDERA, 2001)2. There 
was also the failure of the Zimbabwean government to pay its debts to the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank resulting in the suspension of funding towards projects in 
Zimbabwe (ZDERA, 2001). ZDERA was also self-regulatory as the legislation passed by the US 
Congress implored the United States President to grant Zimbabwe economic aid and debt relief 
if the ZANU PF regime reformed. However if the regime continued to be repressive the 
legislation required the United States President to put in place more stringent sanctions against 
ZANU PF.  
According to Grebe (2010), ZANU PF retaliated with increased repression especially towards the 
MDC who were labelled agents of the West. The same sanctions which were supposed to 
coerce ZANU PF and aid Zimbabwe towards a democratic path were used by ZANU PF to enact 
extensive repressive laws in the name of sovereignty. ZANU PF also embarked on rigorous 
sanctions devising schemes to give the elite alternatives from the West, diverting the nation’s 
attention away from the democratic crisis and efforts of protecting the nation’s economy from 
extensive damage. As highlighted previously, the anti-colonial rhetoric used by ZANU PF was 
meant to create a rally around the flag effect in which sanctions were often labelled as illegal 
and perceived as an act of war (Portela, 2013). This is so because sanctions open themselves up 
to exploitation by the targeted regime. In the Zimbabwean case the sanctions unwittingly gave 
ZANU PF pretext to enact repressive laws enabling extensive control over the people with state 
resources such as the police and army. 
Furthermore, for sanctions to succeed, a united front from the international community is 
required. This was not the case with ZANU PF as it had the backing of Russia and China. This 
may be attributed to those countries tenuous attachment to democracy and because they 
vetoed against the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Zimbabwe (Bush and Szeftel, 
                                                                 
2"Full Text of S. 494 (107th): Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001". GovTrack.us. 13 
December 2001. Retrieved 20/04/2014. 
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2007). This gave ZANU PF the precedence to call the sanctions illegal and blame them for all the 
country’s problems. 
Bush and Szeftel (2007) postulated that the lack of reproof towards the ZANU PF regime by 
African leaders and organizations did less to legitimise the targeted sanctions against Z ANU PF. 
This was further aggravated by the fact that the former colonial master was spearheading the 
imposition of targeted sanctions and the anti-colonial rhetoric worked in ZANU PF’s favour.   
Bush and Szeftel (2007) further comment that the targeted sanctions lacked support in Africa as 
African leaders continuously endorsed and congratulated ZANU PF on winning elections in 
Zimbabwe irrespective of  how  contentious they were. 
It is suggested that it is the struggle of revolutionary parties in Africa of the need to hold on to 
power, mistrusting the new cosmopolitan world with globalization and the reform which 
represents a new form of colonization which suggests that African leaders would have to 
relinquish power and succumb to neo-liberal global principles, politically and economically 
(Bush and Szeftel, 2002).  
Despite the illusion of appearing to inspire democratic process in Zimbabwe, targeted sanctions 
had the adverse effect of crippling the Zimbabwean economy. The targeted sanctions had a 
significant influence in destabilising the Zimbabwean economy. ZDERA encouraged 
international financial institutions to cut the aid to Zimbabwe in fear that it may be used to 
fund ZANU PF (Will, 2003). Furthermore, according to Will (2003), the sanctioning of the 
majority of the leaders of the party meant that the country could not be dealt with in the 
business world considering the extensive allegations of human rights violations. Zimbabwe 
became a pariah in the international community and international businesses distance 
themselves to protect their image and to maintain relations with sender countries  as well which 
were usually more powerful. According to Will (2003) targeted sanctions resulted in the 
isolation of Zimbabwe thereby disadvantaging sectors of society benefiting from the 
international community, opposition parties and businesses. 
The targeted sanctions suffocated an already ailing economy with a government which was 
committed to using the country’s diminishing resources and channelling funds to maintain its 
13 | P a g e  
 
position of power. These actions left the country with less or no funds for economic recovery 
and damage control. According to Magaisa (2009), despite the fact that a collapsing economy 
was a common enemy to all Zimbabweans, ZANU PF managed to manipulate some aspects of 
the economy to effectively control, manipulate, segregate and garner support. The crumbling 
economy resulted in the  increased scarcity of food  where the  ZANU PF started to politicise 
and hoarding food, thereby producing the same vile situation they should be repelling(Magaisa, 
2009). Numerous allegations were levelled against ZANU PF for excluding people presumed to 
be of the opposition parties in the distribution of food. These allegations also included the side-
lining of particular areas of opposition domination in the distribution of food aid.  
Sanctioning Zimbabwe’s leadership also resulted in their businesses being sanctioned, bringing  
the consideration of corruption to be explored in this study Magaisa (2009) proposes that the 
ZANU PF leadership and their position of power since independence of the country 
accumulated resources and control the country’s major industries . This is supported by the 
evidence that individuals in the ZANU PF leadership directly or indirectly own some of the 
largest companies in Zimbabwe particularly after many of international companies left the 
country in 2002. Therefore once they were sanctioned the ripple effect of a failing major 
company was felt by the ordinary Zimbabwe. Therefore, the targeted sanctions against ZANU 
PF did not end with those targeted but the effects rippled down to the ordinary Zimbabweans. 
The EU and the USA continuously reviewed the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe. The 
reviews were conducted to access the actions and responsiveness of the ZANU PF regime to the 
targeted sanctions and to determine whether tighter measures were required or not.  
According to Portela (2013) since 2002, the commission delegated by the EU to regulate the 
targeted sanctions imposed against ZANU PF had continuously tightened the sanctions. This 
was due to the lack of progress in the democratic process in Zimbabwe.  Furthermore Ferguson 
(2005) after the imposition of targeted sanctions the ZANU PF government barred election 
observers from Europe and the USA from the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections, as well as 
the 2005 parliamentary elections . The EU concluded that the observers were banned because 
of electoral malpractice with voter intimidation and therefore the targeted sanctions were 
tightened. 
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 According to Magaisa (2009) the inefficacy of sanctions against the ZANU PF regime until 2008 
may be largely attributed to the ability of the ruling elite to shield themselves from the 
economic turmoil in the country. Furthermore the population had grown tolerant to the 
thriving black market in the country. Increased Chinese trade and cooperation also provided a 
buffer to the unprecedented collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. However, according to 
Magaisa (2009), in the March 2008 presidential elections where presidential candidate from the 
opposition party MDC Morgan Tsvangirai won but was prevented from taking up the presidency 
resulted in an escalation of tensions between the ZANU PF and MDC. The aftermath of the 
elections was bloody encounters between ZANU PF and the MDC. Even the ordinary citizens, 
who had been tolerant up to this point, expressed feelings of injustice (Magaisa, 2009). The 
country was marred by violence tantamount to a civil war which was further exacerbated by a 
crumbling economy, mass emigration of the country’s most productive age group and 
professionals and by the tightened targeted sanctions which had a trickledown effect to the 
rest of the population (Magaisa, 2009).  
The turmoil in Zimbabwe resulted in intervention by Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and South Africa to foster a power sharing deal between the competing parties to save 
the failing state.  According to Munjoma (2012), despite the multitude of contributing factors, 
Zimbabwe saw the formation of the unity government in Zimbabwe as a victory for the 
targeted sanctions. The unity government was formed by ZANU PF, MDC – M led by Author 
Mutambara and MDC – T led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Upon the appointment as Prime Minister, 
Tsvangirai was tasked with campaigning for the removal of targeted sanctions against ZANU PF 
officials and entities. This indicated that to some extent, the ZANU PF regime had felt the 
pressure from the sanctions.   
According to Munjoma (2012) the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the 
formation of the unity government resulted in the easing of the targeted sanctions. This was 
due to the easing of some repressive laws by the unity government, particularly the freedom of 
media which Tsvangirai was very vocal about. Furthermore Breytenbach (1996) is of the opinion 
that the peaceful shifting of power in a country through free and fair elections can be used as 
an indicator of a transition to democracy. In the Zimbabwean case the willingness of the ZANU 
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PF regime to relinquish some of the power and share was considered as a step towards 
democracy with the view of total regime change, hence the easing of the targeted sanctions to 
reciprocate the assumed step towards democracy.  
An examination of the impact of targeted sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe 
gives contrasting views. It therefore solicits the question of whether sanctions aid or impede 
democracy. As discussed above, sanctions created room for ZANU PF to become more 
repressive and yet pressurised the same regime into making democratic concessions. 
1.4. RATIONALE AND RELEVANCE OF STUDY 
Munk and Verkuilen (2002) are of the opinion that with the inception of the 20th century, 
despite cultural bounds and differences, people are becoming more conscious and aware of 
gender equality, individual rights and freedoms which are best promoted under democratic 
rule.  
The study is therefore important as it looks at how best democracy can be promoted in 
countries like Zimbabwe where individual rights and freedoms are violated. The study couples 
democracy and sanctions because the latter has become the most popular method for Western 
countries to promote democracy, therefore the study is relevant in investigating whether 
sanctions are a viable tool in promoting democracy.  
Currently, a series of the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe are being removed as incentives 
for improvements towards ruling democratically with further supports   from the MDC.  The 
study therefore seeks to explore the links identified above in order to ascertain the effects 
sanctions have had on democracy in Zimbabwe.  
1.5. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED 
The major objectives of the research study are to critically analyse the concept of democracy 
and the potential impact of sanctions in promoting or impeding it. The research is centred 
around the conflicting views of whether targeted sanctions are a useful tool in coercing 
governments towards a democratic path focusing on Zimbabwe. 
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1.6. OTHER RESEARCH OBJECTIVES WILL INCLUDE 
 To analyse the reasons that motivated the imposition of sanctions in Zimbabwe in 2000. 
 To understand how Zimbabweans view democracy through their own experiences under 
the sanctions regime. 
 To explore and draw attention to the implications and impact of smart sanctions on the 
democratic process in Zimbabwe. 
 To explore the economic impact of sanctions on the economy and people of Zimbabwe 
from 2000 to 2013. 
  To explore and draw attention to the implications and impact of smart sanctions on the 
democratic process in Zimbabwe. 
1.7. QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN THE RESEARCH 
 What compelled the United States of America and the Europeans to impose sanctions 
against   Zimbabwe? 
 What was the impact of sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 
2013? 
 What was government strategy in dealing with sanctions economically and politically? 
 What is view and position of political groups on sanctions? 
 What is the civil society’s view and position on sanctions? 
1.8. LIMITATIONS 
The main limitations faced in pursuing this study were access to information, time constraints 
and release of a clearance form to conduct field research. The lack of clearance from the ethics 
committee derailed the project by a full semester this further had negative implications with 
the interview schedule and participants, resulting in the cancelation from participating by 
some.  
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1.9. SUMMARY 
The topic represents an opportunity to explore the efficacy of sanctions and the dynamics 
between North-South relations and the political global economic relations. Smart or targeted 
sanctions are a fairly new tool used in diplomacy hence the need to explore how they are used 
and the effect they have. The Zimbabwean case is ideal considering the human rights cases 
made against Zimbabwe’s leaders and the prominence of such cases in international rela tions 
in the 21st century. Smart sanctions have become the tool of choice for the West in dealing with 
such cases and targeted sanctions are preferred when a country is unwilling to actively 
intervene in another to promote or dissuade against particular actions. However there is a need 
to investigate whether these are an effective method in promoting democracy or whether they 
hinder the process.    
Investigating the effects of targeted sanctions is integral to exploring their effect given that 
there are various forms of targeted sanctions which may be deployed. Seeking to understand 
the effects of each form will reveal whether or not they have aided the transition to multiparty 
democracy. Smart sanctions have gained a reputation for being not the smartest method to use 
in promoting democracy despite them being termed smart. Despite targeting particular 
individuals, when imposed, smart sanctions ended up harming the general populace. The West 
has recently begun withdrawing the sanctions packages imposed against Zimbabwe and the 
ZANU PF government at a time when Zimbabwe has just held elections  and the results had 
ZANU PF taking full control of the government signalling the end of the government of national 
unity. This was deemed to be one of the successes of the sanctions regime. It is therefore 
imperative to first investigate reasons behind the imposition of sanctions against the ZANU PF 
government then the effects of the sanctions on the regime and more importantly, reasons 
behind the removal of the sanctions and finally, whether or not they have achieved their 








2. INTRODUCTION  
The main aim of this study was to ascertain how sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe have 
impacted on democracy in the country. The study first analysed the state of democracy in 
Zimbabwe considering the statutes of democracy which the West deemed to have been 
undermined resulting in the imposition of sanctions. The two main focus areas of this study are 
democracy and sanctions. Therefore the substantive theory of democracy was  used as a 
framework for the research as it focuses on the substantive principles of democracy which 
determine the country’s level of democracy. The substantive approach also provides a 
measurement for democracy. The Institutional theory of sanctions was also used to investigate 
the sanctions for the purpose of this study to measure the Zimbabwean case in relation to 
democratic principles. The institutional theory of sanctions therefore connects the concepts of 
democracy and sanctions. The failure or success of sanctions was measured using the effects 
they have had on the leaders in the Zimbabwean regime with the country posing the sanction 
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2.1. SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY 
 According to Eckstein (1975) the substantive approach to the theory of democracy focuses on 
the continued competitiveness of elections in a country and goes further to include the rule of 
law and human rights. This approach uses the Polity Data Series which makes conclusions about 
a state’s level of democracy by evaluating its electoral process , participation and 
competitiveness (Eckstein, 1975). According to Marshall (2012) the United States of America 
(USA) and Britain have higher scores on the Polity Data Series; therefore an investigation was 
carried out based on those democratic principles to determine what principles the Zimbabwe 
regime broke which would result in the imposition of sanctions. This substantive approach was  
also used to conceptualize the concept of democracy which will aid in determining Zimbabwe’s 
position in respect to democracy. This theory is important because it conceptualizes and 
measures the level of democracy based on universal democratic principles. 
Mecellem and Doherty (2012) comment that the elements of democracy highlighted by this 
theory stand as a prerequisite in establishing a democracy. It does not refer to the definitional 
terms for democracy. This approach’s main purpose is to conceptualize democracy linked to a 
theory which is empirical and open to amendments with different approaches concluding at a 
common definition of democracy. This is therefore why there is less focus on definitional terms 
for democracy and more on what constitutes democracy. Substantive elements of democracy 
represent the core of the idea of democracy and have led to efforts of trying to enumerate 
levels of democracy through the Polity Data Series. 
Another very important tenet of the substantive approach to democracy is that a transition to 
democracy should involve supplying outcomes that encourage equality amongst the 
population. This highlights how the substantive approach is not only concerned with the 
definition of democracy but the means needed to achieve democracy.  The main premise of the 
theory to achieve the ends of democracy is social justice and therefore, the political 
participation of citizens in the governing of a country should yield equal socio-economic 
outcomes. Eckstein (1975) seeks to explain the substantive principles of democracy by 
exploring congruence. Eckstein (1975) reference to the term congruence claims that a regime is 
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only stable to the extent to which its authority satisfies the people’s authority beliefs regardless 
of the type of regime. The claim seems to propose that substantive democracy has a supply and 
demand trend, in relation to democratic freedoms. The logic of the supply and demand trend is 
that the ruling elite institutionalizes and supplies substantive democratic freedoms to satisfy 
particular demands of these freedoms made by the people. This therefore implies  that a strong 
correlation exists between institutionalized democratic freedoms by the regime and the desired 
freedoms by the population. The supply and demand trend of substantive democracy is 
encapsulated in a legitimacy framework as congruence moulds regimes by influencing the mass 
constituency support on which it can depend on and those constituents it risks antagonizing. 
The belief in the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a regime sets the tone for the demand of 
substantive democratic freedoms. Democratic regimes supply ample substantive democratic 
freedoms which results in extensive support which stabilizes the regime. However, it is 
plausible that substantive democratic freedoms are not intrinsically valued in a democracy by 
the people, rather the public demands strong willed leaders akin to authoritarian rulers, 
highlighting a possible paradox with democracy (Eckstein, 1975). On the other hand, 
authoritarian regimes are under no pressure to supply substantive democratic freedoms 
because the threat of repression or the actual use of repression is possible, this ensures that 
the regime remains stable. The people under an authoritarian regime settle to conforming to 
the status quo and alter their preferences. Therefore, the threat or use of repression allows the 
regime to persist (Eckstein, 1975). 
Huntington (1990) contends that authoritarian regimes are not always illegitimate, especially 
when the citizenry adapts to the conditions set by the regime and demand for substantive 
democratic reforms is subtle. Authoritarian regimes were once popular and enjoyed extensive 
support therefore, when opposing sentiments emerged they were not always shared and 
widespread; therefore, as long as there was ample support for the regime would claim some 
form of legitimacy.  
However when opposing views become established, widespread and expressive, the 
consideration of the cost of repression by the authoritarian might prove to be too high. If the 
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opposition is grounded in their beliefs and the legitimate demand for substantive democratic 
freedoms, an authoritarian regime can possibly be overwhelmed and destabilized even with 
extensive use of repression which could work against the regime as it might yield more 
opposition (Eckstein, 1975).  
The focus on the substantive approach is to highlight the commitment to democratic freedoms 
by the people in power and ordinary people. The powers which supply governance to the 
people show commitment to democratic principles through the promotion and respect for 
democracy through their daily use of power. Therefore, it can be argued that the supply of 
substantive democratic freedoms due to pressure from the international community does not 
indicate true respect and the promotion of democracy as it is done to gain favour from the 
international community and not to satisfy the demand from the people. A Leader in power 
should abide to the rule of law in order to show a commitment to democracy (Eckstein, 1975).  
One indicator which shows a lack of commitment to substantive democratic freedoms is 
corruption. Embezzlement, nepotism and bribery are all indicators of the violation of the rule of 
law. On an extensive scale, corruption cripples democratic regulators in spending and 
recruitment. Undermining democratic regulators through corruption and violating the rule of 
law disempowers the civil society (Eckstein, 1975). Therefore, if the people are not empowered 
through democracy then that would relate to unsubstantiated democracy. It is therefore 
imperative that those in power respect and promote democracy in the daily use of power. 
When considering the demand for a democratic rule, a country’s citizens  must appreciate the 
intrinsic value of democracy for the freedoms that define it in order to demonstrate 
commitment to democracy. Therefore, a demand for democracy in the hope for economic 
prosperity is not an intrinsic valuation of the substantive freedoms that define democracy but 
an instrumental valuation, a means to an end. The intrinsic value of an embedded ideal  
encourages expression and action by the individual, therefore, not having an intrinsic valuation 
of the substantive freedoms of democracy results in low expressive utility which ultimately 
leads to less action against an undemocratic regime. To be consistent and to be expressive, the 
demand for democracy should be coupled with a rejection of authoritarian rule, particularly 
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rule by the military. Democracy should be demanded for its emancipative and empowering 
values. The basic beliefs underlying the values of democracy include freedom of expression, an 
orientation of equality, self-determination and autonomy. These beliefs empower the people to 
achieve the ends of   democracy.  
Congruence has mechanisms which must operate in order to induce those in power to supply 
substantive democratic freedoms. The mechanisms within the demand system must work 
sufficiently enough to provide extensive pressure for a transition to democracy. The first 
requirement is that there has to exists a demand generating mechanism by which people 
develop an intrinsic valuation of substantive democratic freedoms. The second requirement is 
that a demand initiating mechanism which creates an, intrinsic valuation of substantive 
democratic freedoms must exist and early enough to enable the evolution towards expressive 
action by masses which affects those in power. Furthermore, since it is an intrinsic valuation it 
must withstand repression if the regime in question decides to use it a method of response.  
The two main factors which affect the first demand generating mechanism are experience and 
utility. If one has been previously exposed to democracy and they hold an intrinsic valuation of 
substantive freedoms, it follows that they would reject authoritarian rule. Therefore, according 
to Rustow (1970), having had experience with substantive democratic freedoms and having an 
intrinsic preference for it is a demand generating mechanism as one would have an intrinsic 
valuation of the substantive democratic freedoms). The utility derived from being exposed to 
democratic freedoms therefore generates a demand for democracy if those in power become 
democratically regressive by enacting repressive laws. 
However having had exposure to democratic freedoms is not the only demand generating 
mechanism. The second is the utility reasoning which is in contrast to the reasoning through 
experience as a demand generating mechanism.  
 Welzel (2008) contends that the idea of being able to exercise freedom to people who lack 
previous exposure to democracy and freedom can be intrinsically appealing is the idea of being 
able to exercise those freedoms. Furthermore, the increasing level of education in a society 
which has not been exposed to democracy widens the society’s expressive repertoire along 
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with its awareness especially amidst repression. Therefore such a society becomes willing to 
stand up for ideals they are fully conscious of and believe in. Hence this desire is perceived as 
an actual utility and a demand generating mechanism for substantive democratic freedoms. 
The demand initiating mechanism is dependent on whether the beliefs behind it are intrinsic or 
superficial. A society with a highly intrinsic belief system is moved more by the perceived utility 
to be gained from exerting its freedom; this therefore appropriates the perceived success or 
failure of immediate action for a transition to democracy. The need to attain substantive 
democratic freedoms remains constant despite immediate success or failure because it is 
intrinsically valued. Superficial demand for democracy is evident by ease through which the 
desire is abandoned at the face of repression or perceived failure in the transition to 
democracy. The demand initiating mechanism is when the demand generated translates to 
action and it can only persist if the demand is intrinsic and not instrumental. 
The substantive democracy perspective is therefore helpful in understanding democratic 
transition and it gives insight on the Zimbabwean case by considering the supply side of 
substantive democratic freedoms by the ZANU PF regime and the response from the demand 
side by the   Zimbabwean people. 
2.2. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF SANCTIONS 
The Institutional theory of sanctions was also a guiding theory within the study. Propounded by 
Lektzian (2007), the theory contends that economically punishing sanctions are less likely to 
achieve their intended objectives with an undemocratic regime than against a democratic 
regime. This is attributed to the reasoning that sanctions against undemocratic regimes 
increase the ability of the leader to increase rents thereby accumulating and consequently 
wielding more power. Because the undemocratic regime leadership is usually   small, sanctions 
against such a regime which affect the entire population are unlikely to result in policy change 
as the leaders are not held accountable unlike in democratic states. The latter would be held 
accountable by the people and their constituents and institutions. Therefore all -encompassing 
sanctions according to the theory are more likely to be successful against a democratic state 
than an undemocratic state. Furthermore, sanctions are likely to succeed against an 
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undemocratic if targeted against the ruling government and it constituents. Identifying the 
regime type and the political dynamics at play in the targeted state is therefore critical in 
understanding the impact sanctions will have when imposed. Lektzian (2007) therefore 
proposes a conditional relationship between regime type and the costs that sanctions bring.  
Lektzian (2007 proposes that the pressure to succumb to sanctions is dependent on who bears 
the costs brought by the sanctions. Therefore if the ruling government is cushioned from the 
costs the sanctions the sanctions are most likely persist with no success. Broad sanctions in an 
undemocratic state are unlikely to have any political costs to the larger part of the population 
are not part of the regime’s  leaders.  Measurements for success and failure of sanctions for the 
institutional theory of sanctions are based on a study by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (HSE) who 
studied 116 cases of sanctions since World War I, investigating the success or failure of 
sanctions in achieving foreign policy objectives (Lektzian, 2007). 
The conditional relationship propounded by the theory highlights how democratic leaders are 
more likely to yield to broad sanctions leading to policy changes  and how the paradox of how 
democratic states are less likely to impose sanctions on each other and when they do, it is 
because of competitiveness, as in the case of the American sanctions against Britain and France 
in 1956 with trade wars. Furthermore in such cases of competition, the population is more 
likely to support its democratic government than to clamour for policy change. 
Lektzian (2007) initially explores the sanctions debate in which arguments about how best to 
bring success with imposing sanctions. The arguments can be put into three categories; the first 
category stresses punishment, the second considers vested interests and the third institutions. 
The idea behind punitive sanctions is to inflict extensive economic harm in order to pressurize 
and destabilize the population to the point where it turns and to disintegrate the political 
system. Therefore the targeted state is forced to comply with the demands of the sanctions. 
Economic punishment also stresses multilateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions as they 
remove alternatives and substitute suppliers for the target state thereby increasing chances of 
success. However another possible outcome as highlighted by Portela (2013) is the rallying 
25 | P a g e  
 
around the flag effect which instils nationalism in the population who then endure the punitive 
sanctions. 
The vested interests argument contends that sanctions should carry a political benefit both 
domestically and internationally, success in this argument is evaluation is two – fold. Supporting 
domestic constituents and interest groups appealing for action in the form of sanctions against 
a particular foreign entity brings about political benefit despite the success or failure of the 
actions, merely taking action counts. Building on this preposition, one might argue that Britain 
imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in order to appease a domestic white audience who had had 
their kin and kith abused and murdered during the Fast Track Land reform programme. The 
institutional argument has both elements of the punishment argument and the vested interest 
argument. Similarities of the institutional argument with the punishment argument  are evident 
in the insistence of action in order to impose policy change and like the vested interest 
argument, the institutional argument places greater importance on politics on the domestic 
front. Domestic institutions include the kind of target or the sender regime which plays a major 
role in determining the success or failure of the imposition of sanctions. If a democratic state 
imposes sanctions, it is more likely to succeed in the international arena as it is able to call upon 
other states in order to cut out alternative suppliers. Furthermore states usually impose 
sanctions if there is extensive support for that particular action on the domestic front which 
reaps political rewards. In nondemocratic states however, there is low citizen participation in 
sanction imposition decisions, therefore whether the decision is popular and unpopular there is 
no political benefit domestically. Furthermore, actors in the international arena are unlikely to 
support an undemocratic sender of sanctions resulting in sanctions from a nondemocratic 
sender more likely to fail. The theory therefore seeks to explore the conditions in which 
sanctions are most likely to succeed particularly against nondemocratic governments. 
On imposing sanctions and determining their success or failure, there are paramount factors to 
consider including the demands made by the sender, the political cost on the target’s 
leadership and its constituents. 
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2.2.1. POLITICAL COSTS AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 
With a nondemocratic target, the theory suggests imposing sanctions on the regime’s 
leadership which is contrary to the traditional theory of sanctions which stresses economic 
harm on the whole population. A nondemocratic regime is dependent on its leadership to 
maintain power through developing coalitions and institutions which are important to 
maintaining power in a state. This then blurs the lines   between government and state. The 
coalition and institutions also become dependent on the nondemocratic regime to acquire 
private goods and services. Another element that nondemocratic regimes use to their 
advantage is the distribution of goods and services. Constituents loyal to the regime receive 
more goods and services in order to keep them satisfied, this then ensures that the regime 
stays in power. 
If the target of a sanction is democratic regime, it is held more accountable as it owes its 
position to more than half of the population which voted it into power. Institutions and state 
resources should work for the benefit of the people unlike in a nondemocratic state where they 
serve the needs of the regime. The premium placed by a democratic leader on a prosperous 
economy and successful policies is very high as this insures increasing political benefit and 
support unlike in a nondemocratic state where the leadership is only catered for. The 
nondemocratic regime does little to cater for the welfare and well-being of the rest of the 
population. A democratic regime will therefore pursue policies to supply public goods and 
services and a nondemocratic regime will pursue policies which supply private goods and 
services to its constituents. Because of the lack of accountability, a nondemocratic regime 
suffers little or no political costs due to economic failure caused by a sanctions regime because 
it is able to shield itself from the effects by manipulating available resources. 
Economically punishing sanctions equip the ruling party in the sanctioned regime, especially 
under an autocratic regime, to search for financially beneficial opportunities which can be 
exploited. Economic sanctions which result in shortages present an opportunity for those in 
power to hike prices as they usually control the main producers within the state. A democratic 
leader however is unable to exploit and extort resources for financial gain from the citizens 
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because of the constraint of democratic institutions. Financial beneficial activities for 
democratic leaders are inconsistent with substantive democratic principles and going against 
them would reduce support from society. The lack of active democratic institutions in an 
autocratic state means the government can have excessive control over the economy and are 
able to easily manipulate resources to extract financial gains.  This is done in the efforts to 
control and manipulate the economy which is also important to exercising political control over 
the whole population. The autocratic regime therefore politicises the economy while being able 
to shield itself economic harm and maintaining the support and loyalty from constituents .  
2.2.2. SENDER’S DEMANDS 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985) contend that the success of a sanctions regime depends 
highly on the intended goals of the sender. Heavy demands such as a regime change as 
imposed by Britain on Zimbabwe carry a heavy price to maintain. If an autocratic regime is 
willing to endure sanctions the sender also faces international political costs due to a defiant 
target. Sanctions are likely to be successful if the cost of defiance outweighs the costs of 
compliance. Heavy demands pressurise the targeted government however, if the demands are 
heavy, an autocratic government will likely endure to defend their position of power. 
Furthermore, an autocratic target is more likely to let its population suffer in order to maintain 
its hold on power. Democratic leaders are however more prone to yield to demands pertaining 
to adhering to democratic norms. International pressure is also often aided by pressure from 
domestic democratic institutions which results in compliance. A sanctioned autocratic target is 
also likely to suffer political costs from its coalition if it decides to cooperate excessively with a 
sender country. However this may result in the retaliation of the targeted leader to not yield to 
the foreign demands to maintain power and not show weakness. A sender will impose 
sanctions if economic interdependence between itself and the target is low. However, this may 
affect the severity of the sanctions where although credible they may have no impact because 
of the lack of interdependence. The target might therefore not yield to the demands. The 
opposite is also true, with high interdependence the sanctions would be severe but not only for 
the target but for the sender as well, the threat of sanctions and demands made would 
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therefore not seem credible. The type of demands made, amongst other variables discussed 
above, determines the success of a sanctions regime. 
2.2.3. DETERMINING SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
Baldwin (1985) is of the opinion that as long as the target incurs damaging costs from being 
under a sanction, the sanction should be considered to be a success.  However this assertion 
makes it almost improbable for a sanction targeted at a regime to fail. It is inevitable that a 
targeted state will incur some form of political or economic costs , even if minor, if sanctions are 
imposed against it and the target responds to the least demands made by the sender then the 
sanction can be considered a success.  On the other hand, Pape (1997) postulates that sanction 
can only be considered successful if policy changes in the targeted regime are due to the 
sanction alone. .  However, because sanctions are a foreign policy tool they are not usually 
employed alone, they are often   insufficient to have an immense impact to effect policy 
change. 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) highlight the multilateral variable in determining success or 
failure of a sanctions regime. International cooperation on imposing sanctions particularly 
against an autocratic regime helps ensure that there is no alternative support; increased 
pressure from the international community will most likely make a target yield to sanctions 
demand. 
The institutional theory of sanctions enables the investigation and the measurement of the 
effects of sanctions in Zimbabwe in accordance with the concept of democracy. The conditional 
relationship between sanctions and the regime type postulated by the institutional theory of 
sanctions, allows the researcher to use both theories.  The researcher therefore intends to use 
the substantive theory of democracy in conjunction with the institutional theory of sanctions to 
investigate the curious case of whether sanctions have aided the transition to multiparty 
democracy or impeded democracy in Zimbabwe. 
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2.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.3.1. SANCTIONS 
Sanctions have long been used as a form of diplomacy by governments in a position of power 
politically or economically to express displeasure towards particular actions done by another 
government (Daoudi and Dajani, 1983). Peksen and Drury (2010) agree as the also put sanctions 
under coercive diplomacy as the mere threat of sanctions can urge a government to change its 
policies. The recurring theme with Daoudi and Dajani (1983) is how sanctions are employed as a 
foreign policy tool to further both domestic and foreign interests. Sanctions can then be used to 
dissuade targeted governments from pursuing certain policies. Daoudi and Dajani  (1983) seek 
to explore mainly economic sanctions as a form of statecraft which can be in the form of trade 
sanctions which originates from centuries ago. An example of this is the Embargo Act of 1807 
between Britain and France in the struggle to control European trade which resulted in trade 
wars. Economic sanctions also come in the form financial restrictions and transactions . Daoudi 
and Dajani (1983) therefore highlight the aspect of political economy of sanctions.  
Doxey (1987) brings to light another facet of how sanctions can be defined and employed. 
According to Doxey (1987), international sanctions are considered to be penalties threatened or 
imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or 
international obligations. These international standards and obligations entail the observation 
and protection of human rights by a government to its people. This has been the main area of 
contention where the Western countries express displeasure in imposed sanctions against 
Zimbabwe.  It can be concurred that sanctions were initially passed to satisfy domestic demand 
and address fears and concerned groups particularly in Britain, who had had property belonging 
to their kin and kith seized in Zimbabwe. However, the dire democratic situation was evident in 
the form of repressive laws, allegations of electoral fraud, opposition beatings and murders, 
nepotism and corruption which resulted in the imposition of sanctions.  
With the inception of the 20th century, despite cultural bounds and differences, people became 
more conscious of gender equality, individual rights and freedoms which are best promoted 
under democratic rule (Munk and Verkuilen, 2002).  Doxey’s assertion of how sanctions can 
30 | P a g e  
 
also be used as an international law-enforcing tool is compounded by Munk and Verkuilen (200) 
who highlight the significance of using sanctions against autocratic regimes in order to promote 
democracy. Munk and Verkuilen (2002) highlight how consciousness of individual rights and 
freedoms is spreading around the world due to globalization, which is a common theme 
amongst authors on sanctions. In light of globalization, Pape (1997) views sanctions as 
ineffective alone, whether targeted or all encompassing. Pape (1997) argues that sanctions 
need to be complemented by another strategy such military intervention to make them 
effective. Pape’s view was echoed by suggestions from Western countries who suggested that 
SADC and South Africa deploy militarily intervention in Zimbabwe. This suggests that they had 
realized that the sanctions alone were initially ineffective. Due to the interconnectedness of 
countries, brought about by globalization, countries under sanctions mitigate the effects if a 
sanction and easily find alternatives to the sender countries.  
Kirshner (1997) further highlights how international organizations are in a position to also 
impose sanctions on other organizations and countries. International organizations such as the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the United Nations 
are also in a position to impose sanctions as they stand as gatekeepers to foreign aid, debt 
cancellation or forgiveness, loans and fundamental economic benefits (Kirshner, 1997).  An area 
of contention however is how at times these gatekeepers have seemingly acted on behalf of 
more powerful states to further their interests since most of the organizations owe their 
existence and sustenance to the powerful countries .   
The involvement of international organizations and their ability to impose sanctions in the 
international arena brings to light another theme under sanctions which is smart or targeted 
sanctions. Smart sanctions seek to avoid harming the rest of the population and only pressurise 
the ruling leaders and their constituents by imposing financial restrictions and bans in order to 
coerce them to change particular policies (Drezner, 2003). Because international organizations 
are gatekeepers and global drivers they are able to fine tune sanctions and target the elite. In 
discussing and analysing smart sanctions Drezner (2003), questions the intelligence of smart 
sanctions. This is in light of the extensive use of smart sanctions in the 21st century against 
countries exhibiting non democratic propensities without fully understanding the socio-politico-
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economic dynamics situation in the country. This usually results in the misinterpretation   of the 
root causes of a crisis and how best to address it. This gives rise to supposedly smart sanctions 
harming the rest of the population.  
Lektzian (2007) as opposed to Drezner (2003) maintains that targeted sanctions against an 
undemocratic regime are more effective than all-encompassing sanctions as they deprive the 
regime of particular necessities, making it easier to coerce the regime towards democracy. In 
the Zimbabwean context, the targeted sanctions and the political dynamics within Zimbabwe 
forced ZANU PF into a unity government with the MDC and one of the major clauses in the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA) was the combined effort to campaign against sanctions 
highlighting the effectiveness of sanctions in coercing the Mugabe regime into a coali tion 
(Munjoma, 2012). Drezner however contends that the general populace still suffer when 
targeted sanctions are imposed as the regime will feel threatened and in order to consolidate 
its power becomes more repressive. This was evident in the initial response by ZANU PF to the 
sanctions until the GPA (Drezner, 2003).  
Drezner highlights the importance of a united effort by countries in passing sanctions against an 
undemocratic regime as the availability of alternatives can undermine their effectiveness . As an 
example, Zimbabwe increased trade with China after the imposition of sanctions and this has 
since been sustaining the Zimbabwean economy (Drezner, 2003). The United Nations Security 
Council failed to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe because Russia and China vetoed against 
the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe perhaps highlighting their own tenuous attachment 
to democracy.      
2.3.2. DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE 
Masunungure and Badza (2010) trace Zimbabwe’s democratic record up to 1980 and        
postulate that Zimbabwe’s democratic track record before the year it went under sanctions, 
2000, was not at all since one would assume that Zimbabwe only failed to observe international 
standards in 2000. Masunungure and Badza (2010) highlight the fallacy of democracy which had 
existed in Zimbabwe before 2000. The ZANU PF regime had for years stifled opposition parties 
in order to maintain its hold on power. As an example, the authors highlight how allegations of 
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electoral fraud in the 1996 presidential elections were made by opposition candidates but were 
ignored by the international community.  The reason sanctions were passed in Zimbabwe only 
in the year 2000 therefore becomes an intriguing case considering that before the year 2000, 
amidst allegations of failure to observe international standards, the same governments that 
passed sanctions in the year 2000 neither investigated nor passed sanctions then. 
Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) also do a similar analysis to Masunungure and Badza  
(2010) and contend that ZANU PF has been tightening its grip on power, marginalising and 
ousting anyone who challenges its position since 1980. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) party, which was as active as ZANU PF in the 1980s was marginalised by the latter. Their 
history against ZANU PF is similar to that of the MDC, which despite having some success, has 
currently just subsided after the Unity Government. Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) 
highlight a trend in Zimbabwe’s politics of maintaining a one party state which has been so 
since the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.Ndlovu – Gatsheni (2010) also echoes the same 
sentiments shared by Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) stating that social, political and 
economic power has been centralized amongst the Shona people of which the ZANU PF is 
largely made up of and the marginalization of other ethnic groups. Furthermore, Ndlovu – 
Gatsheni (2010) highlights the inconsistency with the international community in human rights 
watch. He highlights the incident where almost 20 000 Ndebele people were massacred in the 
1980s by government forces and no sanction were imposed, however, when a handful of white 
farmers were murdered there was an outcry from Europe.   
This inconsistency is also echoed by (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) who contend that Britain, being a 
former colonial master, wanted to continue exerting its influence in Zimbabwe especially with 
their regime change campaign, considering that their kith and kin had been murdered and their 
properties and land taken. Britain therefore had its own agenda and rallied other European 
countries to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. The MDC, ZANU PF’s biggest opposition, seized 
the opportunity presented by Britain to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. Not undermining 
Britain’s concerns with Zimbabwe, but with the continued rise of MDC, a serious democratic 
crisis was looming in Zimbabwe. Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) bring to light the extensive 
repressive laws that were passed by the ZANU PF regime in order to quell Britain’s agenda and 
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the advances of MDC. The repressive laws included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) 
and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA) both passed in 2002 
(Maposa, Muguti and Tobias, 2013). The legislation passed infringed on the rights and freedoms 
of Zimbabweans. 
Ferguson (2005) postulates that the substantive elements of democracy in Zimbabwe were 
being violated by the ruling elite and further discusses and analyses elections in Zimbabwe and 
highlights the extensive disparities in both parliamentary and presidential elections in 
Zimbabwe from 1996 to 2005. International observers have been banned from monitoring 
presidential elections and at times have been prevented from entering the country (Ferguson, 
2005). Magaisa (2009) contends that the ZANU PF regime violated substantive elements of 
democracy in the name of sovereignty. Bush and Szeftel (2007) concur that ZANU PF, as the 
revolutionary party, used the anti-colonial rhetoric to pass controversial legislation in the name 
of sovereignty. 
2.3.3. SANCTIONS IN ZIMBABWE 
In 2000, the European Union imposed smart sanctions against the ZANU PF regime, due to the 
continued interference by Britain about Zimbabwe’s democratic situation.  Portela (2013) 
makes an in depth investigation of the criteria used to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe and the 
type of sanctions imposed. The sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe were not endorsed by the 
United Nations therefore the European Union drafted the smart sanctions initially through the 
Cotonou Agreement. This agreement gave the European Union legal precedence to withdraw 
aid and other benefits to a signatory who did not promote democracy (Portela, 2013). However 
is affected all Zimbabweans as the aid which was restricted was for all Zimbabweans not just 
ZANU PF. This further validates Drezner’s question of whether sanctions are really smart, 
(Portela, 2013) as well investigates the intelligence of smart sanctions.  
Sims, Masamvu and Mirell (2010) like Portela (2013), trace the imposition of sanctions against 
Zimbabwe to the Cotonou Agreement. However, they extend their analysis to the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery bill (ZDERA). ZDERA was the USA’s response to the 
Zimbabwean crisis in 2000 and, like the sanctions imposed by the European Union; it involved 
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travel bans on top ZANU PF personnel, aid cuts, arms embargoes and asset seizures. However 
as highlighted by Portela (2013) the European Union sanctions were open to revision on a more 
regular basis if there were improvements in the democratic situation in Zimbabwe unlike 
ZDERA.  
2.3.4. EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS 
ECONOMY 
Will (2003) considered the numbers of Zimbabwe’s deteriorating Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and how the sanctions have impacted negatively on an already derailing economy. Furthermore 
Will (2003) highlights how Zimbabwe was slowly being marginalized by international businesses 
and investors. Will (2003) further draws attention to the economic impact of sanctions on the 
country’s economy as whole, despite the sanctions being targeted at the ZANU PF regime. On 
the other hand Magaisa (2009) explains that the response of the ZANU PF regime to the 
imposed sanctions on how that had consequences on the rest of the population, revealing that 
sanctions, even if targeted, can have a ripple effect on the rest of the population. Magaisa 
(2009) highlights how the ZANU PF elites managed to manipulate the economy in order to 
shield itself from the effects of the sanctions, this being a precise prediction from Lektzian’s 
institutional theory of sanctions. The ZANU PF regime started a series of tactics to overcome 
sanctions. This highlights the need for a united effort in imposing sanctions as postulated by 
(Lektzian, 2007) 
DEMOCRACY 
Grebe (2010) explores how the ZANU PF regime responded to the imposition of sanctions and 
the rise of MDC, like (Bush and Szeftel, 2007) (Grebe, 2010) highlights how ZANU PF under the 
guise of sovereignty sought to maintain its hold on power at any cost. The violence in 
Zimbabwe was further exacerbated by a defiant opposition party and this put Zimbabwe on the 
brink of a civil war. Fortunately as (Munjoma, 2012) postulates the clashes led to peace talks 
instead of a civil war. Sanctions had contributed to putting Zimbabwe’s economy into turmoil 
and amidst this crisis the Global Political Agreement was signed and a government of national 
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unity formed between the major competing parties. Accessing sanctions therefore and their 
impact on democracy is twofold, as ZANU PF initially responded by being repressive and later 
on resorted to negotiations and even forming a unity government.  
2.3.5. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
Bush and Szeftel (2007) contend that the Zimbabwean situation put African leaders and 
organizations in a conundrum.   Despite the evident undemocratic practices and human rights 
violations, the country which was mainly in conflict with Zimbabwe was Britain a former 
colonial master. Therefore regional leaders, having fought colonialism, felt compelled to 
support a fellow African leader than aid a former colonialist against a fellow comrade. The anti -
colonial rhetoric therefore worked in ZANU PF’s favour allowing regional electoral observers 
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2.4. SUMMARY  
According to Mugari (2010), currently, a series of the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe are 
being removed as incentives for improvements in democracy especially with the GPA, with 
support from the MDC as well to remove sanctions. The recent removal of targeted sanctions 
would lead to the assumption that they were successful, however even the MDC were in 
support of the   removal of sanctions which were meant to aid democracy. The call by MDC for 
the removal of sanctions implied that even if they were targeted sanctions, they had a domino 
effect to the countries citizens.   
The substantive approach to democracy will aid in identifying democratic statutes which were 
broken prompting the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe by the West. The substantive 
approach to democracy puts extensive focus on human rights and freedoms and the rule of law. 
The institutional theory on sanctions goes a step further in analysing the impact of the 
sanctions particularly against an undemocratic regime which makes the theoretical framework 
ideal for the Zimbabwean case.  
The timeline of events in Zimbabwe shows a correlation between land reform before and after 
independence revealing that  the acquired repressive character of the revolutionary party of 
Zimbabwe ZANU PF lead to the imposition of sanctions up to the introduction of a more 
democratic rule  in Zimbabwe. The study therefore seeks to explore the linkages identified 
above in order to ascertain the effects sanctions have had on democracy in Zimbabwe. 












The purpose of this study was to establish whether or not sanctions are an effective tool in 
promoting democracy in countries like Zimbabwe where human rights violations are rampant. 
Establishing the efficacy of sanctions requires a close examination of their impact on the 
Zimbabwean political landscape and to the common Zimbabwean both socially and 
economically. Therefore, the study will utilise research tools that will explore the previously 
adumbrated concept of democracy in conjunction with sanctions.  Data was collected using 
both structured and unstructured questionnaires.   
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study used both a qualitative and quantitative research design using primary data in the 
form of interviews and questionnaires focusing on Zimbabwe but included studying and 
analysing existing data in the form of historical data, content analysis of past studies on this 
particular topic and numeric data. Qualitative and quantitative research design helped the 
researcher with insights on the strengths and limitations of the substantive approach to the 
concept of democracy as well as providing a platform to highlight the strengths and weaknesses 
of the institutional theory of sanctions in assessing the effects of sanctions on democracy.  
The research design empowers the researcher over determents and factors that affect the 
validity and reliability of the study. Therefore, the research design determined how the study 
was carried (Burns and Grove, 1997). The study utilised open ended interview questions with 
ward councillors which allowed for more flexibility. The quantitative questionnaire distributed 
to ordinary Zimbabweans had closed ended questions and participants had to choose an 
answer from a likert scale enabling the research to be themed and structured. The use of a 
questionnaire was the appropriate method to use considering the objectives of the study. 
The use of both qualitative and quantitative methodology allowed the researcher to triangulate 
data collected with the intention of increasing reliability of the study. According to Delport 
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(2002) a study would be more reliable if there are multiple types of data which complement 
each other. This is what triangulation strives to achieve. Delport (2002) further comments that 
the triangulation method is the conscious mix of quantitative and qualitative methodology. 
Triangulation was therefore used for this study for combining data from interviews and 
structured questionnaires. Making use of triangulation enabled the researcher to have a 
comprehensive image of how sanctions have affected democracy in Zimbabwe. Combining the 
qualitative and quantitative methodology further enabled the researcher to partially surmount 
disparities from previous researchers and from differing research methods (Denzin, 1989).   
3.3 TARGET POPULATION 
The research project sought to investigate if sanctions imposed by the West have aided the 
transition to multiparty democracy or impeded.   . Therefore the manner in which   the ordinary 
Zimbabwean is affected becomes important since it is the ordinary Zimbabwean who cast the 
votes for their leadership and is governed by the leadership and the one who lobbies the 
government for ideal policies. However the questionnaire requires that the respondent be 
literate and have some knowledge about the subject matter. As highlighted earlier, the study 
will target a sub set of the population in order to make a fair representation of the rest of the 
population. Using the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute’s database, the researcher also sent out 
email questionnaires to respondents in other cities besides Harare.   
For interviews, the research targeted individuals actively involved in Zimbabwean politics since 
the core of the research project pertains to democracy. Furthermore, to avoid bias, the 
researcher interviewed politicians from different political parties and independent political 
analyst. 
3.3.1. SAMPLING 
Since the entire population cannot be targeted, a subset of the population is targeted to make 
estimations about the population. Along the same vein, the research project targeted particular 
individuals for both the questionnaires and interviews. Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, 
harbours the most political and economic activity in the country. Furthermore, population 
patterns are such that more people are migrating to Harare. This validates completing the study 
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in Harare as it will provide a fair representation of the entire population. Probability sampling 
was used to list targets using the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute’s database with respondents 
who are not in a position of power since the study targeted ordinary citizens. A probability 
based sample was then made of the selected targets based on occupation as individuals 
occupying political positions were not selected so as to get survey ordinary Zimbabwean’s view 
of the impact of sanctions.   The randomly selected targets were then contacted by email and 
telephone in order to distribute the questionnaires. 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
The researcher focused on both primary and secondary data, using the former to supplement 
the latter. Previous research, similar to the topic being investigated, has been mainly based on 
secondary data. Secondary data employed included articles exploring sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe, policy documents, newspapers and internet articles.  
3.4.1 PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION 
Primary data entails the researcher venturing into the field to collect data through interviews, 
questionnaires and observations and building or comparing it with existing data. As highlighted 
earlier, research on this particular topic has been based mainly on secondary data and 
discussions on how sanctions have affected Zimbabwe have been limited to leaders and less on 
the ordinary Zimbabwean. Therefore, making use of primary data collection contributed to the 
extension of this area of research. Primary data collection also aided in unravelling whether 
sanctions have aided the transition to multiparty democracy or impeded democratic transition 
in Zimbabwe. The main limiting factors of the study were time and financial constraints as well 
as accessing the selected sample for this type of data collection. The researcher enlisted the 
Zimbabwe Democratic Institute to assist in targeting appropriate candidates for interviews and 
to assist with the distribution of questionnaires. The Zimbabwe Democratic Institute is a 
prominent player in research and public policy analysis in Zimbabwe for sustainable democracy.  
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3.4.2. THE USE OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
When conducting research on a fairly large scale, a questionnaire is more appropriate as a data 
gathering instrument and can be used alongside various tools in order to validate the findings. 
According to Bailey (1996), a questionnaire is a set of predetermined questions in a 
predetermined order and participants respond to the same series of questions.  
The advantages to using Questionnaires include saving costs through time and money. 
Furthermore, a questionnaire can be completed by the respondent at a place and time of their 
convenience as opposed to interviews. If designed to be short, precise and easy to administer 
questionnaires could yield better results as respondents would be able to focus on completing 
the questionnaire and provide   a fast inflow of data from many respondents (Bailey, 1996). 
However despite the advantages of questionnaires, their major flaws can render data 
irrelevant. Since they are self-administered, participants might give imprecise or deceptive 
answers and the researcher is not in a position to identify this whereas in a face to face 
interview the researcher can identify change in tone or body language to detect disparities in 
responses (Beed, 1985).  
According to Gray (2004), despite having standardized questions on a questionnaire  and 
considering their objective objectivity,  questionnaires ultimately reveal the researcher’s world 
view and even issues left out of the questionnaire reveal things the researcher’s world view. 
The questionnaire designed for this study strives to capture the interests, perceptions and 
values of the respondents. The nature of questionnaires is such that they will be understood 
differently by different respondents and responses are unlikely to be standardized as well. The 
questionnaire however has been designed to be precise avoiding jargon and ambiguity.  
The researcher gave out structured closed ended questionnaires to ordinary Zimbabwean 
citizens not in a position of political power. The questionnaires were randomly distributed 
through the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute’s data and self-administered. Structured questions 
allow the researcher to test specific premises as data collected can be codified easily and 
without taking too much time. Since the audience was fairly large, using a questionnaire is 
fitting as it aided in identifying and exploring links between variables using a critical analytical 
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method. The questionnaire was three pages long and it was structured so that the themes of 
democracy and sanctions were dominant. These themes were then broken down with 
connecting sub themes.  
The questionnaire was divided into three sections, the first section deals with demographics of 
the respondents highlighting age, gender, employment status and political affiliation. The next 
section dealt with democratic processes in Zimbabwe with items 5 – 22, seeking to draw out 
the perceptions of Zimbabweans on the main substantive principles of democracy and how 
they are carried out in Zimbabwe. The substantive principles which make up the sub-themes 
are democracy, political party relationships, public policy and institutionalization. From these 
themes, questions were designed to connect the above themes to probe the respondents on 
their perceptions of Zimbabwe’s democratic process.  
 The third section with items 23 – 47 deals with the impact of sanctions on democracy in 
Zimbabwe, which was the focus of this study. The questions in the third section build up from 
the previous section questioning Zimbabwe’s democratic process. This section also pertains to 
ways in which sanctions could have indirectly impacted Zimbabwe’s democratic process. These 
elements include the impact on of sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy, on international 
relations and the respondent’s own experiences with democracy in relation to sanctions.  
 The above issues were responded to by the respondent using a four-level likert scale from 
strongly disagree represented by 1 in the questionnaire to strongly agree represented by 4. This 
method of scaling is termed bipolar measuring as it measures positive or negative feedback.  
The four level-likert scale avoids a neutral option because participants, in the initial section, 
highlighted their political affiliation and to avoid bias the questionnaire neglected the neutral 
option.  
3.4.3 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
Interviews with open ended questions were held with primarily ward councillors from political 
parties and independent political analysts lasting between fifteen to twenty minutes. The 
researcher facilitated the interview process by guiding the interviews and following the theme 
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of the study, thereby identifying areas of contention. Permission to record the interviews with 
all the respondents was requested prior to each interview.  
 Considering that the issue of sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe was perceived strongly by 
most Zimbabweans interviews were found to be necessary since, in some cases where a 
questionnaire was used, participants were not given an opportunity to fully express themselves. 
Gray, (2004) postulates that  Verbal and even non – verbal communication from respondents is 
important in deducing the feelings the respondents have about the subject  hence, interview 
sessions gave the researcher an opportunity to probe for more information and clarity from the 
respondents.   
 However the main purpose of these interviews was to detect variables and their relationships 
on how sanctions have affected democracy in Zimbabwe focusing on whether sanctions have 
aided the transition to multiparty democracy or impeded democracy. Establishing those 
relationships will be based on the respondents’ feelings, attitude, preferences and knowledge 
about the topic.  The interviews also supplemented the questionnaire in order to get an in 
depth understanding of trends and variables revealed by the latter. 
Although the researcher had a list of questions and issues to be explored, the interviews were 
semi structured to accommodate new variables and relationships that may arise based on the 
respondents’ views and opinions. The topics and the themes covered in the interviews mirrored 
those in the questionnaires and were created from the objectives and key research questions of 
the study. The first theme that was covered was democracy which had sub-themes of the 
democratic process in Zimbabwe, the relationship between political parties, implementation of 
democratic principles and the independence of institutions. These themes were then merged 
with the main theme of sanctions, which had sub-themes of the impact of sanctions on the 
democratic process in Zimbabwe, impact of sanctions on the economy of Zimbabwe, sanctions 
and political situation in Zimbabwe and sanctions basting in Zimbabwe.  
Semi structured interviews also allowed the respondents to explain their answers and the 
researcher to probe further over a matter of interest if it aids in meeting the objectives of the 
study (Gray, 2004). The researcher had to improvise when the interviewee strayed away from 
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the subject relevant to the study since the questions have been deduced from the research 
objectives. The researcher however tried to posit the same questions to all participants so as to 
easily sift variables and their relationships. Adhering to standardized questions to all 
participants also helped ensure their anonymity (Gray, 2004).The interviews were recorded 
with the respondents’ consent.   
The interviews were scheduled to begin from the 21st of April 2015 and the researcher 
anticipated concluding the interviews in mid May 2015. The researcher was solely responsible 
for costs incurred with the interviews which included travel costs and recording equipment. 
Since these were identified as possibly inhibiting factors, the researcher, with the aid of the 
Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, will target relevant respondents from different perspectives 
until a level of data saturation is attained and no new perspectives arise. The institute will also 
be advised on ethical issues with the interviews and others that may arise. 
 3.4.4. SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION  
Secondary data is research which already exists in a subject area. Secondary data is important 
as it guides in finding gaps in researched areas and on how best to advance research in the 
area. Secondary data provides the background needed to contextualize different themes within 
a subject area. For this particular topic, the extensive research that exists is largely desk based 
research, therefore the inclusion of primary data would add to research and pave way for 
further research.  
Considering that the Zimbabwean situation is quite recent limited literature exists on the 
subject. However, there are extensive compendia on the topic. Internet articles on the topic 
and on related topics from reputable scholars were used. Policy documents on legislation 
passed by the government of Zimbabwe and public policy documents from the ministry of 
finance of Zimbabwe were used to analyse if sanctions were an aid or impediment to 
democracy in Zimbabwe. These documents will be used alongside the data gathered and 
analysed from the interviews and questionnaires. 
 Data from pre-existing research has made up most of the circulating notions and theories 
about the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe and if that has had an impact if any on 
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Zimbabwe’s democracy. Data gathered from primary sources will therefore also be used to test 
against these preconceived notions and theories on the impact of sanctions on Zimbabwe’s 
democracy. 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis entails identifying themes and to test hypotheses from data collected. 
Hubberman (1994) contends that there are three flows of action in data analysis which include 
reduction, displaying of data and drawing conclusions.  Data reduction entails identifying, 
selecting themes and simplifying the data. Data displaying allows the researcher to link patterns 
and relationships within the data after reduction (Hubberman, 1994). Thereafter, conclusions 
can be made as the data analysis process was followed.  Qualitative data analysis is therefore 
an incessant process.  Data analysis for this study will begin the moment the first interview 
takes place. 
 The researcher used thematic data analysis, emphasizing examination and pattern / theme 
recording within data collected. Thematic data analysis involves going beyond recorded 
interviews by picking up explicit and implicit ideas in the interviews. A theme is not necessarily 
determined by continued reoccurrence or frequency, rather by prevalence within and across 
sets of data (Gray, 2004). With thematic data analysis, coding is very important as it allows the 
researcher to develop patterns though grouping and gathering data before interpretation, 
therefore, coded data makes up a theme (Hubberman, 1994).Connections between coded data 
builds up themes and connections between themes produce the final report.  
The questionnaire sought to explore how sanctions have impacted on democracy in Zimbabwe 
and to what extent. Since the questionnaire was designed to allow the researcher to explore 
relationships, statistical analysis maybe employed its purpose being to determine trends. 
Therefore, despite being open to new information, the study will utilise a deductive approach in 
analysing the data, meaning data analysis is driven by preconceived notions and theories. 
Deductive data analysis seeks to test theories  against data focusing primarily on aspects of the 
data which were preconceived (Hubberman, 1994).  
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3.6 RELIABLITY AND VALIDITY  
The reliability and validity of a questionnaire is affected mainly by the questionnaire’s design, a 
perplexing structure, question sequencing and the words used. The questionnaire for this study 
was designed directly from the objectives of the study so as to avoid questions not pertaining 
to the area of research and also to avoid irrelevant questions. As highlighted earlier, the 
questionnaire was designed to be precise and to avoid it being long.  
According to Alford (1998), the reliability of a study is measured by its consistency over time, 
equivalence and multi-judge reliability. The administration of the questionnaire by respondents 
is also important for reliability (Alford, 1998). Data can be rendered null if respondents do not 
fill out a questionnaire as required. Therefore instructions on how to complete the 
questionnaire and what is required of the respondent should be clear.  
The respondents targeted are experts in their fields and since the research project requires, to 
a larger, extent expert knowledge and experience, data collected is from the appropriate 
people. Furthermore, the designed questions are aligned to the research objectives to ensure 
that research tool is measuring what it is supposed to measure. The interview technique to be 
used seeks to build trust so as to allow respondents to fully express themselves (Alford, 1998). 
The interviewer’s behaviour will also have to be standardized in order to avoid bias therefore 
despite the researchers own preferences and views.  
The ‘interviewer effect’ is the consideration of the interviewer’s behaviour and how it 
influences how the interview is conducted and whether the interviewer’s behaviour had an 
effect on the results or not. Therefore to avoid and minimize bias the researcher will follow the 
same etiquette and will have a set of guidelines to aid the researcher in following the same 
modus (Alford, 1998). The guidelines will include asking all respondents questions exactly as 
they have been prepared; avoiding infuriating respondents if they happen not to answer 
particular questions, to accept refusal  by respondents to respond without  showing frustration 
and probing in an indirect way.  
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The interviews to boost the credibility of the study will be consistent with plausible informants 
and analysis. Furthermore, the analysis will strive to be accurate and be an unbiased 
representation of the respondents as the researcher strives for neutrality.  
3.7 SUMMARY 
The research design chosen for this study was ideal as there was a need to get first-hand 
information of the experiences of ordinary Zimbabwean under the ZANU PF regime and the 
sanctions imposed on them.  More importantly, it was crucial to investigate if the sanctions 
improved the political experience of the ordinary Zimbabwe as intended by the sanctions.  
Therefore the use of questionnaires and interviews was ideal for the study, supplemented by 
secondary data already in existence. 
The questionnaires sent out were themed, requiring respondents to respond on a likert scale. 
Respondents were required to rate statements regarding substantive principles of democracy 
and   the democratic processes in Zimbabwe which included the electoral processes, rule of law 
and governance. This theme was then merged with the subject of sanctions, how sanctions 
have affected democratic processes in Zimbabwe and the impact of sanctions on the social and 
economic lives of Zimbabweans. This enabled the researcher to test the subs tantive theory of 
democracy on the Zimbabwean case on whether sanctions had aided or impeded democracy. 
There was sufficient accurate feedback from the questionnaires as 85 out of 100 questionnaires 
were returned unspoilt and completed.   
Interviews were intended to be used to supplement data gathered through questionnaires. 
Unfortunately the researcher was unable to interview all intended informants. Due to the late 
issuing of field research clearance, the researcher was unable to carry out scheduled 
appointments with key informants who eventually declined participating in the study,  However 
data gathered from informants who participated was sufficient in explaining and clarifying in 
the  trends and relationships evident in the .  
Data analysis was carried out for both the interview sessions and the questionnaires using 
thematic data analysis. During data collection, the data was themed with new trends and 
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relationships being integrated. Since the data collection tools were designed using themes, 
thematic data analysis was ideal for the study and the limited timeframe the researcher had to 






























This chapter presents and analyses the findings of the research project. The source of the 
findings analysed under this chapter were the self-administered questionnaires supplemented 
by the interviews carried out with political analysts and ward councillors. The questionnaire was 
structured in such a way that there were thematic segments which integrated linking 
democracy and sanctions. There was a wide range of responses on how sanctions affected the 
transition to democracy in Zimbabwe. The interview sessions also revealed interesting 
perceptions on how sanctions directly or indirectly affected the transition to democracy. 
Furthermore, views on the course which Zimbabwe should take to enable the transition to 
democracy were also brought up.  
4.1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
A total of 100 questionnaires were distributed randomly with the assistance of the Zimbabwe 
Democratic Institute, 85 questionnaires were returned fully completed and unspoilt. Out of the 
85, 46 were completed by males and 39 were completed by females. Both groups randomly 
selected were within an age range of between 22 and 54.The mean age of the participants was 
33, median 31 and the mode was 26. Is any significance in this age group? Out of 85 
questionnaires distributed, only 49 participants were willing to highlight their political 
affiliation, with 27 indicating that they were affiliated with MDC and 22 indicated that they 
were aligned to ZANU PF, and 36 declined to indicate their party affiliation. Almost half of the 
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4.2 DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE 
An observation which came from the questionnaires was that 49 participants out of the 85 fully 
completed and unspoilt questionnaires were willing to write the party they are affiliated to. 
This probably shows that fear and victimization still lurks amongst Zimbabweans with regards 
to political issues. To understand whether democracy exists in Zimbabwe, respondents were 
asked to rate the statements on a likert where 1 represent strongly agree, 2= agree, 3 = 
disagree and 4 = strongly disagree. 
 
Democratic process in Zimbabwe   1    2  3 4 
There is no human rights monitoring and conscious  74 % 13% 5 % 8% 
There are laws which are repressive and neglect human 
rights 
41 % 29% 18 % 12% 
The ruling party is using authoritarianism to remain in 
power 
32 % 35%  8 % 25% 
Citizens cannot freely express themselves without fear 
of condemnation 
44 % 29% 21 % 6 % 
There is no supportive political culture regarding 
democracy 
39 % 31% 18 % 12% 
Table 1: Democratic process in Zimbabwe 
The above responses show that 74 % of respondents strongly agreed that there is no human 
rights monitoring and consciousness in Zimbabwe.  A standard deviation of 9 highlights how the 
responses were extensively dispersed and distributed and the skewedness shows that the data 
was far from being normally distributed as the majority of respondents expressed the dire need 
for human rights in Zimbabwe. Consequently, there are laws which are repressive and neglect 
human rights (41 %) hence the responses were positively skewed. Even though the Government 
of National Unity in 2009 achieved normalcy on the political front, 35 % of respondents felt that 
there are still some grey areas since the ruling party is using authoritarianism to remain in 
power. The above evidence shows that there is a strong positive correlation between how 
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respondents view repressive laws in Zimbabwe and the increasing authoritarian nature of the 
government. A correlation coefficient of 0.8shows that authoritarianism is exhibited by the 
government is done through neglecting statutes of democracy and the employment of 
repressive laws. Even after the adoption of the new constitution, there are still reports of 
people being persecuted which instil fear in people. This position is shown by 44 % of the 
respondents who highlighted that citizens cannot freely express themselves without fear of 
condemnation. Therefore, the use of repressive laws suggests that to date, there is no 
supportive political culture regarding democracy in Zimbabwe (39%). The low dispersion of 
responses, clustered around the latter responses with a standard deviation of 10. 
4.2.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES 
The following table shows the statements regarding the relationship between political parties 
where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Disagree, 4 = strongly disagree 
2.The relationship between political parties   1    2   3  4  
There is multiparty political participation  35 % 41% 15%  9 % 
There are cordial relationships between political parties   9 %   4 % 19% 68% 
There is one party domination and limited government 
accountability  
29 % 38% 26%  7 % 
The constitution promotes multiparty competition and 
individual rights 
12 % 18% 41% 29% 
Table 2: The relationship between political parties 
The continued growth in the number of political parties in Zimbabwe has changed the political 
landscape in Zimbabwe. The evidence presented above shows that a total of 41 % of the 
respondents agreed that there is multi-party political participation in elections. Of which special 
reference is attributed to the rise and prominence of MDC over and above other parties such as 
ZAPU, (mention other parties that have participated as well) since 2000 and even 
Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn which was formed in 2007(check the year the party was formed) has 
participated fully in elections. Although there has been a sturdy growth in the number of 
opposition parties, 68 % of the respondents were of the opinion that there was a lack of cordial 
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relationship between political parties. The evidence is supported by data with a low standard 
deviation of 9.4, with the data mainly clustered around the strongly disagree response. Hence 
there has been a long documented history of bloody clashes between Zanu PF and MDC 
factions.  
Ever since independence, there is no party that has strongly challenged ZANU PF hence 38 % of 
the respondents agreed that there one party domination resulting in limited government 
accountability. The lack of accountability by members of parliament as according to interviewee 
Professor Masiya once commented “the new generation of politicians view public office as a 
means to an end, they view public office as an instrument for private accumulation”. The 
structures in place make it seemingly difficult politicians to fully account to their constituencies 
especially those aligned to Zanu PF. Furthermore, the domination of Zanu PF in parliament has 
continued to protect the party’s hold on power as evidenced in the implementation of the new 
constitution. Hence a 41 % of the participants disagreed that the constitution promotes 
multiparty competition and individual rights. To date the draconian laws such as AIPA and POSA 
continue to be used as tools to suppress opposition.   
4.2.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCATIC PRINCIPLES 
Rate the following statements regarding democratic principles where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = 
agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree 
3. Adherence to democratic principles  1  2  3  4 
There are free and fair elections held regularly  6 % 12% 12% 70% 
There are reported cases of deeply flawed elections 46 % 24% 23% 7 % 
There is voter representation in parliament  27 % 36% 24% 13% 
There is an independent electoral commission 12 % 20% 35% 33% 
Table 3: Implementation of democratic principles 
Although Zimbabwe has gone to elections when choosing Councillors, members of parliament, 
and the president, most (70 %) of the respondents indicated that they strongly disagreed with 
the notion that free and fair elections are held regularly.  Furthermore 46 % of the participants 
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strongly agreed that there are reported cases of deeply flawed elections. Based on the above 
opinions, Zimbabwe’s entire electoral process is discredited.  There are a number of reported 
cases where the electoral commission has demonstrated partiality in the electoral process, 
which has increased the distrust in the whole process, hence 35 % of the respondents disagreed 
that there is an independent electoral commission.  However 36 % of the participants indicated 
that they agree that there is a fair representation in parliament. Considering the low standard 
deviation of 8.2, the responses were clustered between respondents who agree and disagree 
on the voter representation in parliament. Despite the existence of the electoral commis sion 
appointed in terms of the electoral act, the evidence shows that the commission has become 
subservient to the ruling party such that fair voter representation can no longer be guaranteed 
at any level of government.  
4.2.4. INDEPENDENCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The following table shows statements regarding democratic institutions where: 1 = strongly 
agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree 
4. Independence of institutions  1   2  3  4 
There is clear separation of power between the 
executive, judiciary and legislature 
25 % 10% 52% 13% 
There are no institutions or mechanisms to hold 
government officials accountable 
14 % 18% 34% 34% 
Lack of democratic institutions has dissuaded foreign 
and domestic investment 
41 % 24% 30%   5% 
Table 4: Independence of institutions 
The independence of state institutions is vital in any democracy. To achieve this there is need 
for clear separation of power between the executive, judiciary and legislature. The results show 
that 52 % of the respondents disagreed that there was a clear separation of powers; hence the 
evidence shows that the state and government have become a substitute of one for the other. 
The status quo has created an enabling environment for ZANU PF to tighten its grip on the 
political, economic and social fronts. As a result of lack of democratic institutions foreign and 
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domestic investment has been affected negatively (41 %). A strong negative correlation 
between the lack of democratic institutions and foreign direct investment exist, the value of R is 
negative 0.96 meaning that democratic institutions are needed to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
4.3 THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE 
To understand the impact of sanctions of sanctions on the democratic processes in Zimbabwe, 
the following table was used where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly 
disagree 
4.3.1. THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE 
The impact of sanctions on the democratic process in 
Zimbabwe 
 1  2  3  4 
Sanctions are hurting the democratic rights and 
freedoms of ordinary citizens 
 9 % 17%  53 % 21% 
Sanctions have stalled democracy in Zimbabwe 32 % 21% 35 % 12% 
The citizens suffer in the court of international public 
opinion as a result of sanctions 
47 % 28% 15 % 10% 
Sanctions had a trickledown effect on the conscience of 
the people to take actions 
57 % 21% 10 % 12% 
Sanctions have on effect where there is no democracy   5 % 13% 31 % 51% 
Sanctions have created room for government repression 45 % 25% 18 % 12% 
Table 5: The impact of sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe 
The above evidence shows that 53 % of the respondents indicated that they disagreed with the 
notion that sanctions directly affect the democratic freedoms and rights of ordinary citizens. 
This diverged from a preconceived notion of this study that sanctions had an impact on some 
substantive statutes of democracy. Hence sanctions have not stalled any democracy in 
Zimbabwe (35%). Judging from the responses, it seems as though ordinary Zimbabweans 
understand that the sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe were targeted at particular 
individuals and institutions. However, in trying to deal with the democratic problem, ordinary 
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citizens have been caught up the political web and they have been made to bear the 
consequences (47%). As can be seen in other economic sectors that are based on perceptions 
such as tourism, the negative equity generated a huge part in affecting tourist arrivals and 
foreign direct investment in the country’s economy.  
As can be seen above, sanctions had a domino effect and affected the ordinary Zimbabwean in 
all spheres of life. The above notion was supported by 57 % of the participants who strongly 
agreed that sanctions had a trickledown effect on the conscience of the people so that they 
take action. However, considering the extensive grip on power the government has, any action 
taken by citizens was quashed through the use of repressive laws discussed earlier. 
Consequently, 38 % of respondents disagreed that sanctions caused citizens to demand change 
from their government. The efficacy of sanctions against an undemocratic government is 
therefore questionable since the government can suppress any action by its citizens should 
they vie for a regime change agenda. Therefore, 45 % of respondents strongly agreed that 
sanctions created room for government repression. In this case sanctions were viewed as an 
impediment to democracy. Although 51 % of respondents strongly disagreed with the notion 
that sanctions have no effect where there is no democracy, their impact on the political arena 
was minimal. Considering that those sanctions were targeted on specific individuals and 
organisations, they ended up affecting the whole populace.  Different schools of thought view 
sanctions differently; some may argue that sanctions were a missed opportunity for democracy 
to prevail since the time was ripe for change. As can be seen in the 2009 disputed elections, the 
ZANU PF government was forced into a Government of National Unity. Although this unity 
government did not persist for long showing, the opposition MDC did not fully utilise its 
advantage to instil democracy instead of putting pressure on the Government by insisting on 
minimum democratic standards, they become so engrossed with power and forfeited bread 
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4.3.2. IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE’S ECONOMY 
Rate the following statements regarding the impact of sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy: 
1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree 
Impact of sanctions on the economy 1 2 3 4 SD 
The economic woes in Zimbabwe are a result of 
government mismanagement not sanctions 
40 % 29% 21 %   8% 10 
Sanctions are blocking economic recovery 34 % 27% 14 % 25% 11 
Sanctions have an effect preventing access to 
international financial assistance 
48 % 32% 13 %   7% 15.9 
Economic suffering has weakened the civic society  47 % 32% 16 %   5% 15.6 
Table 6: Impact of sanctions on the economy 
Although sanctions had an impact on the economic front, when questioned about the causes of 
economic turmoil in Zimbabwe, 40 % of the respondents indicated that they strongly agreed 
that Zimbabwe’s economic mayhem was largely due to government mismanagement. Despite 
the soaring debt the country has on the international financial institutions, the promulgation of 
sanctions cut off Zimbabwe from accessing financial bailout (48%). Consequently, 34 % of 
respondents were of the opinion that sanctions were blocking economic recovery. Since the 
country has been on targeted sanctions for over a decade, continued enforcement of sanctions 
has continued to cause untold suffering for businesses, civic society and citizens alike thereby 
impeding the smooth transition to democracy. Considering that positive change is led by the 
civic society, of which is unfortunately succumbing to the effects of sanctions (47 %). As can be 
seen from the above evidence, the use of sanctions contributed in crippling the economy which 
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4.3.4. Sanctions and Political Situation in Zimbabwe 
Rate the following statements regarding sanctions and political situation in Zimbabwe where: 1 
= strongly agree 2 = agree 3 = disagree 4 = strongly disagree 
Sanctions and Political Situation in Zimbabwe 1 2 3  4 SD 
Sanctions have led to tolerance and cooperation leading 
to democracy  
18 % 12% 45 % 25% 15.2 
Sanctions were used by opposition parties for regime 
change in Zimbabwe 
33 % 25% 20 % 22%  4.7 
Sanctions are no longer smart considering their effects  45 % 31% 14 % 10% 13.4 
      
Sanctions have polarized the political situation 35 % 39% 18 %   8% 12.3 
Sanctions were a deliberate ploy by the West to impose 
itself on Zimbabwe and Africa 
39 % 34% 15 % 12% 11.4 
Table 6: Sanctions and Political Situation in Zimbabwe 
Although sanctions were meant to bring a conduce environment for democracy to prevail or 
force the government to adhere to democratic principles, 45 % of the respondents disagreed 
that sanctions have led to tolerance and cooperation. As can be seen from the literature, there 
is evidence of recorded clashes between the two main political parties as a result of the 
imposition of sanctions. ZANU PF has argued that sanctions were being used by opposition 
parties for regime change in Zimbabwe.  Since opposition parties took advantage of sanction to 
campaign for regime change (33%), that lead to them being labelled as detractors and 
dissidents who were aligning themselves with the West. Hence, a low standard deviation of 4.7 
showed how the responses to this question were densely populated on respondents strongly 
agreeing that sanctions were being used by opposition parties for regime change in Zimbabwe.  
 Moreover, 35 % of the respondents strongly agreed that sanctions polarized the political 
impasse in Zimbabwe by pitting the main political parties against each other. A total of 39 % of 
the respondents strongly agreed that sanctions were a deliberate ploy by the West to impose 
itself on Zimbabwe and Africa. Hence they are no longer smart considering their effects (45%).  
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4.3.5. CITIZEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF SANCTIONS  
Rate the following statements regarding perceptions on sanctions where: 1 = strongly agree 2 = 
agree, 3 = disagree 4 = strongly disagree 
Citizens’ Perceptions of Sanctions  1  2  3 4 SD 
Sanctions did cause citizens to demand change from 
their government 
24 % 21% 38 % 17%  7.4 
General citizens suffered socially and economically from 
sanctions whilst intended targets escaped because they 
had power and opportunities 
45 % 36% 11 %  8 % 15.5 
Sanctions were used as an exaggeration to blame the 
West for the exclusive cause of the country’s troubles  
41 % 31% 21 %  7 %  12 
Table 7: Citizens’ perceptions of sanctions 
The evidence above shows that sanctions did not cause citizens to demand any change from 
the government (38%). As discussed earlier, the failure to change was as a result of many other 
uncontrolled variables. From the above evidence, it is clear that any action against the 
government is perceived as a revolt. Whilst it is a constitutional right to strike, demonstrate, 
and or to openly express one’s opinion, state institutions are not ready to embrace such 
actions.  Respondents were of the opinion that the general citizens suffered socially and 
economically from sanctions whilst intended targets escaped because they had power and 
opportunities (45%). Consequently, 41 % of the respondents strongly agreed that sanctions 
were used as an exaggeration to blame the West for the exclusive cause of the country’s 
troubles. One respondent pointed out that ZANU PF even went on to blame sanctions for the 
drought and other climate change related problems.  
4.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The enacting of repressive laws resulted in Zimbabwe being classified under autocracies with a 
(-10 to -6) score. The Polity Data Series makes conclusions about a state’s level of democracy by 
evaluating its electoral process, participation and competitiveness as shown in the figure 1 
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below (Eckstein, 1975). The polity data series is used as guideline for the substantive approach 
to democracy. Using the polity data series Zimbabwe’s valuation on electoral processes, 
participation and competitiveness is highlighted to be at critical levels. Respondents to the 
survey highlighted how the Zanu PF government has infringed on people’s rights and freedoms 
which make up the core of democracy as stipulated by the substantive theory to democracy. 
Respondents indicated how elections in Zimbabwe were deeply flawed which rendered 
competition null and void. Below is an objective measure of Zimbabwe’s authority trends based 
upon substantive principles of democracy and the assertions and conclusions made from it are 
compounded by the results of the survey carried out for this study.  
Fig. 1: Authority trends, 1970 – 2013: Zimbabwe source: Eckstein, ‘August 2014, Review Paper’ 
Perspective of Comparative Politics. 
Fig. 1 above represents Eckstein’s conception of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe and level 
democracy in Zimbabwe. A negative score in the diagram represents decreasing levels 
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consequently representing increasing levels of authoritarian rule. This study mainly focused on 
the period from 1999 – 2013 which is relevant to this study and also to be used to support the 
findings from the empirical evidence. The period being discussed from 1999 to 2002 is very 
crucial because during this period the Land Reform programme was carried out, a new 
dominant party opposed to Zanu PF was formed which participated in two highly contested 
elections that is the 2000 Parliamentary and 2002 Presidential elections. All these events largely 
contributed to the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe from 2001 onwards by the United 
States of America and some members of the European Union.  
Controversial laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA) both passed in 2002 and the Interception of 
Communications Act of 2007 had a negative impact on democracy in Zimbabwe (Maposa, 
Muguti and Tobias, 2013). These laws applied even to civil society organizations hence the 
extensive number of respondents who highlighted that they cannot freely express themselves 
even though freedom of expression is embedded in the constitution. 
The lack of a supportive political culture emanates from the previously highlighted 
authoritarianism of the government and repressive laws (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). Further 
substantive principles of democracy were analysed to confirm the erosion of democratic 
political culture in Zimbabwe. The authoritarian nature of the ruling party has eroded whatever 
minor democratic political culture developing in Zimbabwe, the majority of respondents 
highlighting how this is due to repressive laws which inhibit freedom of expression. 
Despite the authoritarian nature of the government prior to 2002 Zimbabwe’s level of 
democracy had actually risen in 1998; this was due to the rise of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai. MDC was Zanu PF’s first major opposition party since 
1980 and it posed a formidable challenge (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). However Zanu PF unwilling 
to relinquish power used state apparatus to dissuade and to oust MDC, the majority of 
respondents highlighted how the was a blur between state and government due to the lack of a 
separation of powers which gave the Zanu PF government extensive power over the police, 
army and judicial system all used for Zanu PF’s political agendas (Bush and Szeftel, 2002). 
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MDC was also dissuaded from participating in elections through repressive laws which either 
inhibited public gatherings or freedom of speech and whenever they did participate in elections 
there was always evidence of malice and electoral fraud (Ferguson, 2005). As postulated earlier 
respondents highlighted how there are deeply flawed elections in Zimbabwe and how the 
country lacks an independent electoral commission. This sheds light on a damning report called 
the Khampepe report made by an electoral observation team sent by former South African 
president Thabo Mbeki revealed how the 2002 Zimbabwe presidential elections were flawed 
(Ferguson, 2005). Thabo Mbeki at the time was one of Pres ident Mugabe’s biggest allies 
however the Khampepe report would have worked against Zanu PF’s political agenda and for 
twelve years the South African government did not publish the report; which was a clear 
indication to the malice involved in the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential elections (Ferguson, 2005). 
Elections are a substantive principle of democracy which falls in line with the principle theory of 
this study. Elections as well were a principle factor in the United States and the European Union 
imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe.  
According Lektzian sanctions against undemocratic regimes increase the ability of the leader to 
increase rents thereby accumulating and consequently wielding more power (Lektzian, 2007). 
Sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe were meant to target only members of the Zanu PF 
however some clauses in the sanctions packages targeted state institutions, government 
parastatal and companies belonging to government individuals which were essentially the 
backbone of the country since they own most of the country’s wealth (Portela, 2013). The fall 
of these institutions and companies therefore had trickledown effect to the ordinary 
Zimbabwean. As the majority of respondents highlighted smart sanctions were not as smart as 
they ended up hurting ordinary citizens and those targeted escaped without harm as they had 
power and wealth to cushion themselves from the economic impact of sanctions. 
ZDERA which was the sanctions package imposed against Zimbabwe had clauses in it which 
directly stipulated and affected public state institutions. Sections 4, part C and D of ZDERA have 
the following clauses which instruct the”... Secretary of Treasury and the United States 
executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against: 
61 | P a g e  
 
 Any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the 
Government of Zimbabwe; or 
 Any cancellation or, reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe 
to the United States or any international financial institution” (ZDERA, 2001). 
The bill passed by the United States Congress clearly intended to affect the common 
Zimbabwean aside from the travel bans and asset seizures of high ranking officials, the same 
restrictions were also followed up by the United States counterparts in Europe. Both the 
government of Zimbabwe and the sanctions had a hand in causing economic turmoil in 
Zimbabwe as (Portela, 2013).  
Sanctions were costly to Zimbabwe’s economy respondents highlighted a negative attitude 
towards the mechanics of sanctions. This shows the sentiments ordinary Zimbabweans harbour 
as they continue to see high ranking Zanu PF officials flourish economically in a country with 
unprecedented levels of unemployment rates, a non-existent currency and business 
opportunities are such that only the richest survive who unsurprisingly are Zanu PF officials or 
closely aligned to the party. From this point of view it would seem that sanctions failed to 
convince the people to topple their government and bring about the transition to democracy. 
Furthermore as highlighted by the institutional theory of sanctions the imposition of sanctions 
against an undemocratic state might result in the undemocratic government being more 
repressive in order to tighten its hold on power lest its citizens are easily swayed into action 
against it due to the political or economic impact of sanctions. The sanctions imposed against 
Zimbabwe resulted in the Zanu PF government implementing repressive laws in order to 
dissuade its citizens from conjuring up an uprising against the government. Therefore despite 
the sanctions being economically punitive Zimbabweans endured the sanctions regime because 
of fear of the consequences of rising up against the government (Grebe, 2010). The majority of 
respondents also highlighted how government mismanagement and the sanctions led to 
economic suffering which weakened the civic society therefore organizations responsible for 
standing up people’s rights were disabled and an uprising would have been futile.  
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The Zanu PF government also used a tactic predicated by the institutional theory of sanctions. 
The Zanu PF government tried to use the rally behind the flag tactic against sanctions as the 
government began blaming the country’s woes on sanctions (Lektzian, 2007). Respondents 
even highlighted the same how the government tried to exaggerate the consequences of 
sanctions. However this was simply a sanctions besting tactic and Zanu PF employed it well 
particularly in rural areas where people might have been less informed about sanctions. 
Sanctions were just branded as a deliberate ploy by the West for regime change and indeed to 
some extent indeed it was; as postulated by interviewee Dr. Nyasvisvo “The rise of MDC being 
supported by a former colonial master had the makings of a new form of colonialism which 
brewed malignant nationalism and otherness, the laws were not seen as not repressive but 
actually necessary to guard against would be detractors, the others and neo-colonialism”. The 
West wanted to impose itself and agenda on Zimbabwe however there was a serious a case of 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe which could not be dismissed by the well -articulated 
nationalist sentiments of Zanu PF.  
4.5 SUMMARY 
There was a fairly large pool of respondents and 85 out of 100 questionnaires were unspoilt 
which the researcher could use.  This clearly showed how ordinary Zimbabweans were 
interested in the politics and economics that have disturbed their nation for the past decade. 
The respondents also seemed well informed about the topic, in terms of the questionnaire, 
judging from the responses, they did not appear to be random. The forty-nine participants who 
willingly revealed their political party affiliation aided the research in analysing the different 
opinions and perceptions of the different political parties in Zimbabwe on the sanctions topic. 
Ultimately as proven by the chi-squared test it is plausible that the majority of Zimbabweans 
despite political divides view sanctions as an impediment to democracy rather than an aid. 
The interviews carried out were used to supplement the information gathered from the 
questionnaires. The interview questions being the same as the questionnaire questions 
followed a similar format and style and their main purpose was to get more insight on the 
information gathered and analysed from questionnaires. However, due to time constraints and 
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tight schedules of some interview candidates some of were not interviewed.  However the 
interview questions were emailed to the candidates and they responded by writing down their 
thoughts and opinions on the questions sent.  
The political impasse between Zimbabwe and the West span for over a decade and relations 
are still strained. With the recent 2013 elections the minor developments towards democracy 
became threatened as ZANU PF assumed full control of the government and the MDC factions 
were removed. It was therefore imperative to review the progress if any of the targeted 
sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe as the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe up 
the 2013 elections seemed more regressive rather than progressive and transitional.  
The targeted sanctions it seems lacked the social, political and economic background and in 
depth knowledge of Zimbabwe in order to fully succeed. In some instances ZANU PF ended up 
free riding on the indignation towards sanctions which further sustained its hold on power 
therefore contrary to the topic of this research sanctions were aiding tyrannical rule. Sanctions 
aided ZANU PF’s agenda to guard against colonial rule and influence, they further aided to the 
deterioration of the economy which brought more harm to the ordinary Zimbabwean hence 















The purpose of this study was to determine whether sanctions aided or impeded democracy in 
Zimbabwe. A series of themed questions were created and merged into a questionnaire to 
enquire, from the ordinary Zimbabweans, how sanctions have directly or indirectly affected 
them and more importantly, if democracy has progressed or regressed under the sanctions 
regime. The questionnaire provided the opportunity for respondents to express themselves as 
it enquired about their social, economic and political lives. This was to enable the respondents 
to reveal their experiences under the current government and how sanctions have affected the 
state of affairs in Zimbabwe.  
The self-administered questionnaires were randomly distributed to 100 ordinary Zimbabweans 
with the assistance of the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute. Out of the 100 questionnaires 
distributed, 15 were returned spoiled therefore there were 85 unspoilt questionnaires which 
the researcher used.  The questionnaires had closed ended questions and a four level likert 
scale on which participants had rate measuring positive and negative feedback.  
5.2. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITIATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The main limitations faced in pursuing this project were access to information, time constraints 
and release of a clearance form to conduct field research. The lack of clearance from the ethics 
committee delayed the project by a semester. This had negative effect on the interview 
schedule and participants. As a result, some participants cancelled their participation in the 
study.  The survey instrument used for the study had a likert scale which measures positive or 
negative feelings; however, it does not probe deep into the respondents’ attitude. It is also a 
possibility that respondent’s feelings were influenced by previous questions in the 
questionnaire influencing the manner in which they respond to questions which followed.  
Furthermore, people tend to avoid choosing extreme answers to avoid implications indicative 
of extremism and yet, in some cases, the extreme answer might be one that captures the 
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respondents’ true feelings and attitudes. The researcher therefore tried to use a four level likert 
scale without the neutral option to try curb bias and not giving the respondents an easy answer 
on questions they would want to avoid. The assistance of the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute 
was crucial to overcoming the above mentioned hurdles especially with sampling and targeting 
the right candidates for the study. 
5.2.1 THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS 
The sanctions package imposed against Zimbabwe clearly showed a lack of interest and 
understanding by the West considering that for more than a decade they were not refined  to 
avoid doing harm ordinary Zimbabweans. In fact the sanctions were not repackaged even when 
it was evident that they were doing no harm to their intended targets were failing. This showed 
a lack of interest or need towards the alleviation of the Zimbabwean situation.  
A new approach is needed with regards to imposing sanctions in order to improve their 
efficacy. Understanding the social, political and economic factors at play within a society is 
crucial when imposing sanctions. The sanctions imposed against ZANU PF clearly showed a lack 
of research and understanding of the Zimbabwean people and the situation as a whole. The 
crisis was taken at face value and not much research was taken to understand ZANU PF’s power 
mechanics, including how and why it maintains power. This enabled the ZANU PF to label the 
sanctions as a form of colonialism by ZANU PF, especially in rural areas where it has a 
stronghold. As a result of this, sanctions were used to garner support in rural areas.  The 
inability to understand such dynamics ultimately made sanctions fail. Sanctions were meant to 
appeal to the conscience of the people so that they rise up against ZANU PF, however, in rural 
areas it was predestined to fail as most people’s livelihoods were dependant on ZANU PF 
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5.2.2. SANCTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE 
The imposition of sanctions coincided with an economic downturn in Zimbabwe. However the 
repercussion of the sanctions was the continuous detrition of the unprecedented economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe. The economic woes in Zimbabwe are mainly a result of government 
mismanagement and corruption not sanctions, but the latter have played a major role in 
blocking economic recovery. Clauses in ZDERA, the sanctions package imposed by the USA, 
specifically prevents access to international financial assistance to Zimbabwe. Furthermore it 
halted and blocks funding and assistance to public state enterprises like health and education 
which affect the ordinary Zimbabwean. General Citizens suffered socially and economically 
from sanctions whilst intended targets escaped as they had power and opportunity. This proves 
that sanctions were not smart considering their effects on the ordinary Zimbabwean.  
Thirteen years later and still under sanctions, Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF were contesting in 
the 2013 presidential elections, denouncing the unity government with the two MDC factions 
as an unholy marriage and proclaiming the need to reclaim the Zimbabwe they fought for 
against the colonialists. The sanctions imposed against the ZANU PF regime in 2000 aided in 
derailing Zimbabwe’s economic and political situation.  
The minor successes of sanctions such as the Unity Government of Zimbabwe of 2009 are too 
few to render sanctions as having been successful in their quest for regime change and the 
transition to democracy in Zimbabwe. The Unity Government is now disintegrated The MDC 
formations which were once prominent supported by the West are slowing falling into the 
oblivion due to extensive in house fighting and defections. The extensive democratic reforms 
made under the unity government such as the freedom of the press considering have been 
reversed and can still be reversed  since the same Zanu PF government which once trampled 
upon them is the same government which now has full control of government having ousted 
MDC in 2013. Sanctions therefore did not achieve what they set out to do in 2000 which was to 
aid democracy in Zimbabwe through regime change. Rather, sanctions created room for the 
ZANU PF government to get a better grip on power and to drive away any feasible opposition. 
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5.2.3 SANCTIONS BASTING  
Another important area to be addressed when imposing sanctions is the unity of the 
international community itself. The United Nations failed to impose sanctions against 
Zimbabwe because Russia and China vetoed against the resolution to do so. Sanctions imposed 
against Zimbabwe lacked adequate vigour since ZANU PF, after being alienated from the West 
still had good relations with the East. The East has sustained ZANU PF for the past decade and 
was extensively used as a sanctions basting tactic. If the West had managed to convince the 
East of the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe and present a unified front it is possible that   ZANU 
PF might have yielded to the demands of the international community of implementing 
democratic reforms.  
Regional blocks such as the Southern African Development Community and the African Union 
were passive in addressing the Zimbabwe crisis. In light of the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, 
regional blocks faced a dilemma on whether to support ZANU PF against the West or to oppose 
it. Supporting ZANU PF meant standing in solidarity with a fellow compatriot against a former 
colonial master however regional blocks also had their own interests and relationships with 
regards to aid and development they were unwilling to damage for the sake of Zimbabwe. 
Regional blocks should play an active role in mediating conflicts and affairs of member states 
whenever possible and when human rights are threatened considering that many of these 
organizations were created for furthering the rights of Africans during the colonial era. As of 
late however, due to lack of funding and commitment some regional organizations have 





68 | P a g e  
 
5.3. THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE 
Zimbabwean politics is marred by uncertainty and is in crisis. The two largest political parties 
Zanu PF and MDC dealing with internal succession battles and struggles that stray away from 
attending to the political, social and economic woes facing the country. Democratic 
development lies addressing the social and economic problems facing Zimbabwe first, a radical 
change is required from politicians with regards to political culture with more focus on national 
interests rather than using public office for personal gain. 
The uncertainty surrounding President Mugabe’s successor does little in aiding the political 
situation in Zimbabwe. Of late progressive elements have arisen within Zanu PF and if a 
progressive candidate is chosen it could usher in a new phase in Zimbabwean politics and a 
transition to democracy. A progressive successor would have to tackle certain key areas for the 
transition to democracy; these include corruption, the rule of law and the separation of powers 
in Zimbabwe in order to re-establish trust and cooperation with international and domestic 
partners.   
The West still has a major role to play in the future of democracy in Zimbabwe, a different 
approach and reengagement is required with both Zanu PF and MDC. With Zanu PF a form of 
carrot stick diplomacy is required, providing extensive economic support for progressive 
political reforms and implementing punitive measures for regressive political actions. A slowly 
progressive Zanu PF would be ideal for this type of reengagement with the West. MDC and 
other opposition parties need to revamp themselves in order to attract support and 
sponsorship from the West, of late opposition parties have a dented image with the West due 
to their own shortcomings.  
The future of formidable political opposition in Zimbabwe also lies with the revival of the civil 
society which has over the years been eroded by repressive laws, economic meltdown and 
weak democratic institutions. The West to promote the transition to democracy in Zimbabwe 
needs to promote and strengthen democratic institutions responsible for advocating and 
monitoring human rights. 
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Regional blocs particularly SADC and AU need to take a tougher stance with aiding the 
transition to democracy in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe is currently chairing both and should 
be used as a platform for reengagement on Zimbabwe’s democratic situation by encouraging 
transparency with regards to elections and the rule of law.  
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The majority of respondents reacted negatively to the democratic processes in Zimbabwe. 
There is a serious lack of human rights monitoring and consciousness which emanates from the 
ruling party using authoritarianism through repressive laws which infringe on individual rights 
and freedoms. The current government has been ruling since 1980 has done so using fear and 
condemnation making it nearly impossible to have a supportive democratic political culture in 
Zimbabwe. The few political parties that have managed to emerge and challenge the ZANU PF 
have been removed using state resources from the police, judiciary and legislature. This is a 
further indicator of the authoritarianism used by the government. There is no clear separation 
of powers as state and government have been fused into one. The authoritarian nature of the 
government was a major factor leading to the imposition of sanctions.  
The constitution in Zimbabwe does promote multiparty competition and individual rights 
however it is selectively enforced. There exists multiparty political participation and 
competition but only to a certain level. There is extensive evidence of flawed elections and 
voter intimidation rendering the elections not free or fair. Other political parties besides ZANU 
PF only exists up to this level to create a facade of a democratic republic, elections are usually 
predetermined due to the lack of an independent electoral commission hence the frustration of 
other parties. This has led to the lack of cordial relationships between parties. Furthermore, 
there are no institutions or mechanisms to hold government accountable for such injustices as 
highlighted. This is due to the lack of separation of powers, making it is difficult to contest 
elections.  
Sanctions were not directly meant to hurt the democratic rights and freedoms of ordinary 
citizens. Sanctions were only meant to target and coerce leading members of ZANU PF and 
some institutions into making reforms that improve the lives of Zimbabweans. However smart 
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sanctions were not so smart; sanctions were intended to have a ripple effect on the conscience 
of the people to take action considering how opposition parties were encouraged by the West 
and used sanctions for regime change in Zimbabwe. This only polarized the political situation in 
Zimbabwe and did not lead to tolerance and cooperation leading to democracy. It however 
caused the government to be more repressive and sanctions did not cause citizens to demand 
change from their government for fear of condemnation. Sanctions were labelled as a 
deliberate ploy by the West to impose itself on Zimbabwe and Africa by ZANU PF which was 
one of their sanctions basting tactics moreover that sanctions were used as an exaggeration to 
blame the West for the exclusive cause of the country’s troubles.  
 
 
 
 
 
